If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. -A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?" (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138) … not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object, due to the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instruments. -N. Bohr, "Complementarity and Causality" (Bohr 1937, p. 79) Any "entanglement of predictions" that takes place can obviously only go back to the fact that the two bodies at some earlier time formed in a true sense one system, that is, were interacting, and have left behind traces of each other. If two separate bodies, each by itself known maximally, enter a situation in which they influence each other, and separate again, then there occurs regularly that which I just called entanglement of our knowledge of the two bodies. -E. Schrödinger, "The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics" (Schrödinger 1935, p. 161) Abstract. In recent communications (Khrennikov 2019a, 2019b, 2019c), A. Khrennikov argued for "eliminating the issue of quantum nonlocality" from the analysis of quantum entanglement and quantum phenomena in general. He proposed to differentiate quantum and classical phenomena and entanglement not by their respective nonlocality and locality, as is common, but by the discreteness of quantum phenomena vs. the continuity of classical phenomena, supplemented by Bohr's complementarity in the case of quantum phenomena. As I argue here, however, the question may not be that of "eliminating the issue of quantum nonlocality" but instead of illuminating this issue, a task that, I also argue, can be pursued by relating quantum nonlocality to other key features of quantum phenomena. I suggest that the following features of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, distinguishing them from classical phenomena and classical physics-(1) the irreducible role of measuring instruments in defining quantum phenomena;
Introduction
In several recent communications (Khrennikov 2019a (Khrennikov , 2019b (Khrennikov , 2019c , A. Khrennikov argued for "eliminating" the considerations of nonlocality from the analysis of quantum entanglement and, by implication, quantum phenomena in general. He proposed to differentiate classical and quantum entanglement not by their respective locality and nonlocality, as has been common in discussions of quantum entanglement, but instead by the inherent discreteness of quantum phenomena vs. the continuity of, or more accurately (given that they may be discrete) underlying and connecting classical phenomena, including those of classical entanglement. 1 He also emphasized, especially in (Khrennikov 2019c) , the role of complementarity in this problematic.
Khrennikov's argument offers a useful angle on quantum phenomena and entanglement, for one thing, because the discreteness of quantum phenomena and the role of complementarity have often been neglected or taken for granted in recent foundational discussions, especially those of entanglement. Both were more prominent at earlier stages of the debate concerning quantum physics, in the case of discreteness beginning with M. Planck's discovery of it and especially, following Bohr's 1913 atomic theory (Bohr 1913) , and then his interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics (QM), via his concept of complementarity. This interpretation was introduced in 1927 in the so-called Como lecture, "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," grounded in what Bohr called "the quantum postulate, which attributed to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theory and symbolized by Planck's quantum of action [h] " (Bohr 1987, v. 1, p. 53) . In fact, discontinuity and individuality are equally essential, because each observed quantum phenomenon is both individual, even unique, in itself and is discrete in relation to any other quantum phenomenon.
A crucial point here is that this discreteness is that of quantum phenomena, observed in measuring instruments, rather than the Democritean atomic discreteness of quantum objects (Bohr 1987, v. 2, pp. 32-33) . After a few revisions of his interpretation, Bohr was compelled to introduce a new concept of "phenomenon" in quantum physics in part in order to establish this difference more firmly. In Bohr's definition, a phenomenon is defined by what is observed, in the specified measuring arrangement of each experiment, as the result of the interaction between the quantum object under investigation and the measuring instrument prepared in accordance with this specification (e.g., Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 64 ). On the other hand, because of the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of any quantum phenomena, one can, as against classical physics, no longer describe the independent behavior of quantum objects, by extracting them from the indivisibility of phenomena. This impossibility defines what I call the "reality-withoutrealism" (RWR) view and the corresponding interpretations (there could be more than one) of quantum phenomena, a view that applies only to quantum objects (rather than phenomena, in which case a representation and, thus, realism are possible) and places them, or the reality so designated or idealized, beyond representation or even conception. Realism, by contrast, is defined by the assumption of the possibility of such a representation or at least conception. In RWR-type interpretations, each quantum phenomenon is always discrete in relation to any other quantum phenomenon, without allowing us to know how the quantum phenomena come about. Quantum phenomena may, however, be related to each other, by means of quantum mechanics (QM) or follows, in a realist way) the ultimate individual constituents of nature and their behavior (e.g., Born 2005 , pp. 155, 205, Einstein 1949a .
Accordingly, it might be that that question is not that of "eliminating the issue of quantum nonlocality," but instead that of illuminating this issue, even though the ultimate nature of quantum nonlocality itself may remain beyond illumination. If so, however, it is not because there is a "spooky action at a distance," which would resolve the issue (but, again, not in a way acceptable to either Einstein or Bohr), but because there isn't any such action. In the absence of such an action, it may not be possible to know or even to conceive of the physical reasons for quantum nonlocality or the emergence of quantum phenomena themselves, predicting which will, as I shall argue, always entail predictions at a distance and thus quantum nonlocality as here defined. That, however, does not mean that the issue of quantum nonlocality cannot be further illuminated. One could, I would argue, be helped in this task by relating quantum nonlocality more firmly to other key features of quantum physics, discreteness and complementarity, among them.
I should offer an immediate disclaimer. I do not imply by this elaboration or by my subtitle that this paper can accomplish this task. Instead, using the sense of "illuminating" as reflecting a continuing process, I hope to contribute to this process, in a positive spirit, rather than with the aim of refuting previous arguments, although it will argue against some claims, beginning with the claim that it implies With this disclaimer in mind, I shall argue that the following key defining features of quantum phenomena and QM, possibly distinguishing them from classical phenomena and classical physics (there are quite a few of them!)-(1) the irreducible role of measuring instruments in defining quantum phenomena; (2) discreteness; (3) complementarity; (4) entanglement; (5) quantum nonlocality, and (6) the irreducibly probabilistic or statistical nature of quantum predictions, which pertains to our quantum theories rather than quantum phenomena-are all interconnected so that it is difficult to give an unconditional priority to any one of them.
I am not saying that it is not possible to distinguish quantum and classical phenomena or quantum and classical theory by a single feature, or define them accordingly, as has been suggested in the case of QM, although not quantum phenomena, by recent (reconstruction) projects of deriving QM for discrete, rather than, at least thus far, continuous, variables. Notably, such derivations do not share the same single feature distinguishing quantum and classical theories (which theories still shares other features, as is the case in classical and quantum mechanics). 3 For the reasons explained below, it is tempting to argue, following Bohr, that, if there is any single feature distinguishing classical and quantum physics, it is the irreducible role of measuring instruments in defining quantum phenomena, which prevents us from representing the independent behavior of quantum objects, as against their effects on measuring instruments. This feature would equally apply to discrete and continuous quantum variables. One might, however, prefer to err on the side of caution. For example, while discreteness is automatic under this assumption, complementarity is not. Also, although an entanglement is part of the interaction of between quantum objects and measuring instruments (because this interaction entangles them), and although these interactions ground quantum nonlocality, both entanglement and quantum nonlocality are more general features of quantum phenomena, rather than merely consequences of these interactions. This greater generality is manifested in the EPR-type experiments, because there we deal with two entangled quantum objects, even though, as Bohr argued, the irreducible role of measuring instruments remains part of any EPR-type experiment, a role, he also argued, underappreciated by EPR and Einstein in his subsequent communications (Bohr 1935) . Accordingly, it seems more reasonable to focus on all of these features in their interactions, which may yet not be exhaustive in defining quantum phenomena vs. classical ones.
For one thing, there is still the role of Planck's constant, h, which is not essential to most of Khrennikov's argumentation and is not discussed by him. However, historically, quantum phenomena were initially defined by the fact that, in considering them, h, must be taken into account, which is still the case. Doing so allows one to use classical theory in physically describing observed quantum phenomena (observed in the suitably prepared measuring instruments), although classical physics could not predict these phenomena. This incapacity initially led to the assumption that there must exist entities in nature responsible for these phenomena, entities the behavior of which could be described by classical physics, for otherwise classical physics would be able to predict these phenomena as well. These entities are understood or, in the present view (explained below) are idealized, as quantum objects, in contradistinction to quantum phenomena, defined, again, by what is observed in measuring instruments and requiring a proper quantum theory to take h into account in order to predict them. 4 While, however, the role of h is physically irreducible in quantum phenomena, their specificity as quantum, again, appear to be defined by a broader set of features, such as those in question in this paper (the role of measuring instruments, discreteness, complementarity, entanglement, and quantum nonlocality), some of which are not physically linked to h, at least not expressly. On the other hand, some of these features, although not all of them, are also exhibited by classical phenomena or found in alternative theories, such as Bohmian mechanics (which is expressly Einstein-nonlocal) or "toy" models different from those of the standard QM. 5 Nevertheless, all quantum phenomena, known thus far, cannot be meaningfully considered physically or (quantitatively) predicted apart from taking h into account.
At the same time, from the present perspective, defined by the reality-without-realism (RWR) view, h does not pertain to quantum objects or behavior but only to quantum measurements and our quantum theories. The reason for this is that in the RWR view, the ultimate nature of reality responsible for quantum phenomena, commonly seen or (in the RWR view, idealized) in terms of quantum objects and behavior, is beyond any representation or even conception, physical or mathematical, which precludes associating any numerical constant with this reality. While thus assuming that what is responsible for quantum phenomena exists or is real (and allowing it to be idealized in terms of quantum objects and their behavior), this concept of reality precludes realism, defined by the possibility of representation of the reality considered by the corresponding theory. I shall properly discuss the concept of reality in the next section. Briefly, by reality in general I refer to that which is assumed to exist, without making any assumptions concerning the character of this existence, which allows one to place, as in the RWR view, this character beyond representation or conception. I understand by existence the capacity to have effects on the world with which we interact. Assuming the possibility of representing the character of what is assumed to be real, rather than merely assuming its existence, defines realism.
Importantly, the RWR-type view and the corresponding, RWR-type, interpretations of quantum phenomena only assume the RWR view of the ultimate constitution of reality responsible for quantum phenomena, which allows that some strata of the overall reality these interpretations consider, which includes that of quantum phenomena, may be represented and thus allow for a realist treatment. In the present interpretation, which, on this point, follows that of Bohr, the observable parts of quantum phenomena (the emphasized qualification is, as I shall explain, crucial) are represented by classical physics, while quantum objects and behavior or, again, the reality thus idealized is, as an RWR-type reality, beyond representation or even conception. This difference is subtle, because, while a representation of the reality considered always entails a conception of this reality, the reverse is not necessarily true because a conception of this reality may be short of any workable, especially suitably mathematized, physical representation of it. I shall address this aspect of the situation in detail below.
I would like to emphasize that all my claims in this paper only concern interpretations, those of the RWR type amidst other interpretations (some of which are realist), of quantum phenomena and QM. I make no claims concerning how nature ultimately works. Such claims would, in any event, be precluded by the RWR view, because it places the ultimate working of nature beyond knowledge or even conception, at least as things stand now and possibly ever. One the other hand, the RWR view does allow one to make claims concerning the effects of these workings on those aspects of the world that are available to our thought, representation, and knowledge, such as, with the help of our experimental technology, quantum phenomena observed in measuring instruments.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the key concepts and the main argument of this paper. Section 3 considers quantum measurement, as defined by the entanglement between the quantum object under investigation and the measuring instrument used. Section 4 discusses complementarity and the concept of quantum causality. Section 5 offers a reassessment of EPR's argument and Bohr's reply, and of the role of quantum nonlocality vs. Einstein-nonlocality in EPR-type experiments.
"The unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instrument": measurement and reality in quantum physics
This section outlines the key concepts and main argument of this paper. I would like to begin with a passage from Bohr's important, but rarely cited, 1937 article, "Complementarity and Causality." The article is the first published work by Bohr that presented his ultimate interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, grounded in the RWR view of quantum objects and behavior, or again, the reality so idealized, as responsible for quantum phenomena. It took Bohr a decade to arrive at this interpretation, by changing his views, sometimes significantly, a few times, in part (there were other factors) under the impact of his debate with Einstein, especially their exchanges concerning the EPR experiment. 6 As indicated in the introduction, one feature that most centrally defines the difference between classical and quantum phenomena in all of Bohr's interpretations is "the unavoidable interaction" between quantum objects or something real in nature so idealized, and measuring instruments, an interaction that no longer allows us to speak of the independent ("autonomous") behavior of quantum objects. According to Bohr:
The renunciation of the ideal of causality in atomic physics which has been forced on us is founded logically only on our not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object, due to the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instrument which in principle cannot be taken into account, if these instruments according to their purpose shall allow the unambiguous use of the concepts necessary for the description of experience. In the last resort an artificial word like "complementarity" which does not belong to our daily concepts serves only briefly to remind us of the epistemological situation here encountered, which at least in physics is of an entirely novel character." (Bohr 1937, p. 87) Although complementarity does more, it is, as a quantum-theoretical concept (it could be defined more generally and applied elsewhere), essentially connected to this situation and thus to the RWR view, announced by Bohr's claim of "our not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object." I shall discuss complementarity below, only noting here that it is complementarity that enables this unambiguous use by making some of these concepts (such as those of position and momentum measurements) and the corresponding quantum phenomena, observed in measuring instruments, "complementary": mutually exclusive and yet equally necessary for a comprehensive account of the totality of quantum phenomena. The concept of causality that grounds the "ideal of causality" in question is defined by the claim that the state of a physical system is determined, independently of observation, in accordance with a law, at any and all future moments of time once it is determined at a given moment of time. This assumption, thus, implies a concept of reality first, the reality defined by this law and making the concept of causality ontological (pertaining to the nature of reality). This concept has a long history, beginning with the pre-Socratics, and it has been effective in classical physics, as part of the concept of reality assumed there. I shall term this concept "classical causality," following Bohr's appeal to "the classical ideal of causality," although in the same article and elsewhere, Bohr uses the term "causality" to refer to this concept. The reason for adopting this designation is that, as discussed in Section 4, alternative, including probabilistic, concepts of causality, applicable in quantum physics, are possible and important, including in considering complementarity, which Bohr saw as a "generalization of causality" (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 41) .
I shall also distinguish classical causality (or other forms of causality to be considered here) from "determinism," which is an epistemological category, defined by the possibility of predicting the outcomes of such processes ideally exactly. In classical mechanics, which deals with individual objects or small classical systems (apart from chaotic ones), both notions in effect coincide, at least ideally. (Strictly exact measurements and hence the exact verifications of predictions are never possible in practice.) There are, however, theories such as classical statistical mechanics or chaos theory, that are causal but not deterministic, in view of the mechanical complexities of the systems considered there, which complexity limits one to probabilistic or statistical predictions.
In the case of quantum phenomena, deterministic predictions are no longer possible, even in considering the most elementary quantum phenomena and events, such as those associated with elementary particles. This is because the repetition of identically prepared quantum experiments in general leads to different outcomes, and unlike in classical physics, this difference cannot be diminished beyond the limit defined by Planck's constant, h, by improving the capacity of our measuring instruments. This impossibility is manifested in the uncertainty relations, which would remain valid even if we had perfect instruments and which, at least as things stand now, pertain to the data observed in quantum phenomena, rather than to any particular quantum theory. Accordingly, as things stand now, the probabilistic or statistical character of quantum predictions must be maintained by realist interpretations of QM or alternative theories (such as Bohmian mechanics). That does not prevent a given theory of quantum phenomena to be or to be interpreted as classically causal. There are classically causal interpretations of QM, and Bohmian mechanics is expressly classically causal, but at the cost of being Einstein-nonlocal. The primacy of the concept of reality to that of causality, in this case a concept of reality no longer allowing for classical causality, is also apparent in Bohr's passage just cited, by virtue of his claim that "the renunciation of the ideal of causality in atomic physics" is "forced on us" as a consequence of "our not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a [quantum] physical object." This is a statement concerning the nature of the reality pertaining to, or being idealized by, quantum objects. This claim requires qualification. In particular, while the situation is different from classical physics, where we can observe such a behavior without appreciably disturbing it and can represents it, it is still possible to conjecture or argue for some sort (even, in principle, classically causal) of representation of the independent behavior of quantum objects, unobservable as this behavior may be. One could also attempt, and some have attempted, to interpret quantum phenomena and QM in this way, and other theories of quantum phenomena, such as Bohmian mechanics, are both realist and causal. Bohr's statement is careful in that the term "object" is used neutrally as referring to something under investigation, ultimately a form of reality that is beyond representation or conception, an RWR-type reality, which is only idealized in terms of quantum objects. The nature of this idealization is subtle, and I shall explain it below. For the moment, as Bohr argued in his reply to EPR, still alongside an appeal to "a final renunciation of the classical ideal of causality," quantum phenomena required "a radical revision of our attitude toward the problem of physical reality" (Bohr 1935, p. 697) .
While Bohr, thus, thought that quantum physics required that the classical ideal of causality must be renounced, he only thought that our attitude toward the problem of physical reality must be revised, thus implying that some conception of physical reality may be necessary. In addition, a revision of an attitude toward the problem of physical reality is not the same as a revision of a given concept of reality, a point to which I shall return in closing this paper. Nevertheless, Bohr did think that quantum phenomena do require such a revision, and he undertook it in his work, adopting the RWR view, as is, again, indicated by his claim that we are not "any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object, due to the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instruments." Accordingly, the revision Bohr had in mind, while it required a certain, RWR-type, concept of reality, implied a renunciation of what may be called "the classical ideal of reality" as well, just as it implied, as a consequence, a renunciation of the classical ideal of causality, thus making the quantum-mechanical situation symmetrical in this regard. There are the classical ideal of reality and the classical ideal of causality, and the quantum concept of reality and the quantum concept of causality, with the corresponding concepts of reality and causality are interconnected in both cases. In the RWR view, the ultimate objects, quantum objects, responsible for quantum phenomena, do exist, are real, or idealize what is real, but allow for no physical description or idealized mathematical representation in the way that objects considered in classical physics or relativity do.
Although quantum objects or, again, something in nature so idealized, are thus assumed to exist independently of us and of our measuring instruments, they can never be observed independently, or at least they, say, electrons or photons, have never been observed independently, in contradistinction to quantum phenomena, observed in measuring instruments. Nobody has ever observed, at least thus far, an electron or photon as such, in motion or at rest, to the degree that either concept ultimately applies to them, or any quantum objects, no matter how large (and some could be quite large). That is, nobody has observed them insofar as our observational interference could be neglected and allow us to represent this behavior as independent in the way it can be done with the objects considered in classical physics or relativity. It is only possible to observe traces, such as spots on photographic plates, left by their interactions with measuring instruments. Such a spot or any such effect can be treated as something actual, a representable form of reality, akin to that of classical physics and, again, described by means of classical physics, as against that of quantum objects and behavior, which are equally real but are beyond representation or even conception. Each such trace or a specific configuration of such traces can be treated as a permanent record, which can be discussed, communicated, and so forth. Accordingly, the recordings of such traces are as objective as they are in classical physics or relativity, except that quantum records can only be predicted probabilistically or statistically, even ideally, while in classical physics, specifically, in classical mechanics, our predictions may be, ideally, exact. In quantum physics, only the statistics of multiple identically prepared experiments are repeatable and thus objectively verifiable, which, however, allows quantum physics to be a mathematical-experimental science of nature, just as classical physics or relativity. It would be difficult or even impossible to do so without being able to reproduce at least the probabilistic statistical data and thus to objectively verify the predictions of the corresponding theory.
Although Bohr does not use the language of "reality without realism" (RWR), his view of the structure of quantum measurement as precluding us from being able "to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object," is in accord with the concept proposed here under this name. This concept has been introduced by the present author in several earlier works (e.g., Plotnitsky 2015 Plotnitsky , 2016 Plotnitsky , 2018a Plotnitsky , b, 2019 Plotnitsky and Khrennikov 2015) . It is grounded in more general concepts of reality and existence, assumed here to be primitive concepts and not given analytical definitions. These concepts are, arguably, in accord with most, even if not all (which would be impossible), currently available concepts of reality and existence in realism and nonrealism alike.
By reality in general I refer to that which exists or is assumed to exist, without making any claim, found in and defining realist theories, concerning the character of this existence. The absence of such a claim allows one to place this character beyond representation or knowledge or even conception. I understand existence as a capacity to have effects on the world with which we interact, and the very assumption that something, including the reality of the world, is made on the basis of such effects. Following L. Wittgenstein, I shall understand "the world" as "everything that is the case," thus, as the world of events (Wittgenstein 1924, p. 1) .
In physics, the primary reality considered is that of matter, keeping in mind that the idea of matter is still a product of thought. 7 "Matter" is, generally, a narrower concept than "nature," although when the ultimate material constitution of nature is considered, both concepts merge. Matter is commonly assumed to exist independently of our interaction with it, which implies that it had existed when we did not exist and will continue to exist when we will no longer exist. There are exceptions to this view, including those, such as, most famously, by G. Berkeley, that deny the existence of matter or anything apart from human thought altogether, but these exceptions are rare. The view of matter as existing independently of us is upheld in the RWR-type interpretations of QM, by definition, given the absence of a representation or even conception of this existence. On the other hand, whatever one's view on this latter point, the assumption of the independent existence of matter, while difficult to avoid in physics, is not falsifiable, in contrast to the data observed in measuring instruments or our predictions concerning this data, which (Berkeley had a point there) does not depend on this assumption.
To ascertain observable effects of physical reality entails a representation of them, but not necessarily of how they come about, which implies that a given theory might assume different levels of reality, some allowing for a representation or at least conceptions and others not. Thus, as I said, Bohr's interpretation or, following it, the present interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, or quantum field theory (QFT), assumes that the behavior of the macroworld, as the world of human experience, and specifically of the observable parts of measuring instruments can be represented (in the latter case as treated by classical physics), while quantum objects and behavior, or again, something in nature so idealized, cannot be represented or even allow us to form a conception of them. I qualify by "the world of human experience," because there are macroscopic quantum objects. They cannot, however, be experienced as quantum, but can only be established to be quantum by means of measuring instruments, observed classically.
Realist or ontological thinking and practice in physics, or elsewhere, is defined by the corresponding (realist) theories, which are commonly representational in character. 8 Such theories aim to represent the reality they consider, usually by mathematical models based on idealizing this reality by considering those of their features that can be so mathematized and disregarding those that cannot. It is also possible to have a strictly mathematical representation of this reality, but it is difficult to do so without some mediation by physical concepts. I shall discuss this possibility below, especially in the context of Heisenberg's later thinking. All modern, post-Galilean, physical theories are mathematized idealizations, as is quantum theory, in which case, however, it is an idealization that, in the RWR view, does not involve an idealized representation or even conception of the ultimate reality considered. A physical theory may allow one to only have some knowledge concerning the reality it considers without completely describing or representing it. Any such knowledge, however, would require at least a partial representation of this reality.
It is also possible to assume, beyond merely the existence of the ultimate reality considered, that this reality has an independent architecture of some sort (possibly temporal in nature), while admitting that it is not possible to either adequately represent this architecture by means of a physical theory or a mathematical model, or even to form a concept of this architecture (beyond that of this reality has some form of architecture), either at a given moment in history or perhaps ever. In the first eventuality, a theory that is merely predictive could be accepted for lack of a realist alternative, but under the assumption that a future theory will do better, in particular by being a properly representational theory based on a workable concept of this architecture and the corresponding representational mathematical model. Einstein adopted this attitude toward QM, which he expected to be eventually replaced by a representational realist theory, specifically a field theory of the type general relativity was. Most of those who make such assumptions conceive of this architecture on the model of the conceptual architecture of classical physics or relativity, while leaving the determination of the specific form of this architecture to the future.
What, then, grounds realism most fundamentally is the assumption that the ultimate constitution of reality possesses properties and the relationships between them, or, as in so-called structural realism (Ladyman 2016) , at least a structure emerging from such relationships, that may be either (a) known in one degree or another and ideally represented by a given theory or (b) unknown or even unknowable, but still conceivable and, hopefully, eventually to be represented by a corresponding realist theory. 9 Physical theories prior to quantum theory have been all realist theories. Thus, classical mechanics (used in dealing with elemental individual objects and small classical systems, apart from those considered by chaos theory), classical statistical mechanics (used in dealing, statistically, with large classical systems), or chaos theory (used in dealing with classical systems that exhibit a highly nonlinear behavior) are realist, as concerns the ultimate reality they consider. While classical statistical mechanics does not represent the overall behavior of the systems considered because their great mechanical complexity prevents such a representation, it assumes that the individual constituents of these systems are represented by classical mechanics. The status of these theories as realist could be questioned, on Kantian lines, even in the case of classical mechanics, where the representational idealizations used are more in accord with our phenomenal experience, which, however, as I. Kant argued, does not necessarily correspond to how things, as things-in-themselves, actually are in nature (Kant 1997) . Our phenomenal experience can only serve us partially in the case of relativity. This is because, while we can give the relativistic behavior of photons a concept expressible in language and represent it mathematically, we have no phenomenal means of visualizing this behavior, or the behavior represented by Einstein's velocity-addition formula for collinear motion = #$% &$(#%/)) + . Nevertheless, all these cases, including relativity, allow for viable idealized realist and causal theories, because we can observe the phenomena considered without disturbing them appreciably by measurement. As a result, we can identify them with the corresponding objects, thus amenable, in their independent behavior, to a representational treatment for all practical purposes, even if the reality itself is ultimately different.
The representation of individual quantum objects and behavior became partial in the so-called old quantum theory (also referred to as semiclassical), in particular Bohr's atomic theory, introduced in 1913 and developed by him and others during the following decade (Bohr 1913) . The theory only provided a representation, in terms of orbits, for the so-called stationary states of electrons in atoms, but not for the discrete transitions, "quantum jumps," between stationary states. This was a radical step, central for Heisenberg, who abandoned a representation of stationary states as well, which led him to his discovery of QM (Heisenberg 1925) . In his initial 1925 assessment of Heisenberg's discovery of QM, by then developed into a full-fledged matrix mechanics by M. Born and P. Jordan (Born and Jordan 1925) , Bohr said:
In contrast to ordinary mechanics, the new quantum mechanics does not deal with a space-time description of the motion of atomic particles. It operates with manifolds of quantities [matrices] which replace the harmonic oscillating components of the motion and symbolize the possibilities of transitions between stationary states in conformity with the correspondence principle [which requires that quantum and classical predictions coincide in the classical limit]. These quantities satisfy certain relations which take the place of the mechanical equations of motion and the quantization rules [of the old quantum theory]. (Bohr 1987, v. 1, p. 48; emphasis added) This assessment, as was Heisenberg's own thinking at the time, was thus based in an RWR-type view and, implicitly, on a corresponding interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, such as the one expressly offered by Bohr, in terms of complementarity, in 1927 (the first version of his interpretation), by that time with the uncertainty relations, introduced by Heisenberg, in place as well. According to Heisenberg: "What I really like in this scheme [QM] is that one can really reduce all interactions between atoms and the external world ... to transition probabilities" (W. Heisenberg, Letter to Kronig, 5 June 1925; cited in Mehra and Rechenberg 2001, v. 2, p. 242) . By speaking of the "interactions between atoms and the external world," this statement suggests that QM, as he saw it, was about (predicting) these interactions, observed, as effects, in the measuring instruments involved, a view manifested in Heisenberg's paper and adopted by Bohr in all versions of his interpretation. To return to Bohr's later formulation cited above, we are no "longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a [quantum] physical object, due to the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instruments which [interaction] in principle cannot be taken into account" (Bohr 1937, p. 87) . All that one could say about quantum objects and behavior, or again, the reality thus idealized, could only concern their effects on measuring instruments, probabilistically or statistically predictable by QM, which amounts to the RWR view and a corresponding interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM.
RWR-type interpretations only assume the concept of reality, defined as that which is assumed to exist, while, in contrast to realist theories, suspending or even precluding any claims concerning the character of this existence beyond representation or knowledge or even conception. At the same time, however, there is no assumption of uniform or bulk nature of this reality, which is assumed in the RWR view to be different each time, in each experiment (thus, always singular and even unique), even though this reality is each time unknowable or even unthinkable, and idealized by the corresponding quantum object at this point of time. As I said, the behavior of the macroworld, as the world of human experience, and specifically of the observable parts of measuring instruments form another stratum of reality assumed by these interpretations, a stratum that is representable and, in the case of the observable parts of measuring instruments, is treated by classical physics. The existence of the first, RWR-type, stratum of reality is inferred from the totality of effects they have on world we observed, specifically on measuring instruments. 10 RWRtype reality, idealized in terms of quantum objects and behavior, is both beyond representation or conception and yet is, in each experiment, different.
What is, however, the difference between placing the ultimate nature of the reality considered beyond representation or knowledge and placing it beyond conception, beyond thought altogether? For, if, as Bohr says, we are "not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object, due to the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instrument," would not this already imply this behavior, or again, the RWR-type of reality so idealized, is beyond conception as well? For, if we had such a conception, would we not be able to says something about it? The situation is not so straightforward. First, there is difference between some conception or saying something of this reality and forming a more rigorous concept of this reality that would enable us to provide a complete representation of it by means of the corresponding theory and the mathematical model used by it. In EPR's phrasing of the completeness of a physical theory representing the idea of a realist theory, so cherished by Einstein, "every element of the physical reality [would] have a counterpart in the physical theory" (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138 ). Bohr, by the time of this statement (in 1937) was well aware of this criterion, which considered in detail in his reply to EPR in 1935, and clearly had in mind here. While his RWR-type claim would imply that this criterion cannot apply to how the independent, autonomous, behavior of quantum objects is handled by QM, Bohr saw QM as complete in a different sense: it was as complete a theory of quantum phenomena as nature allows such a theory to be, as things stand now. However, Bohr clearly makes a stronger claim here: we are no longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of quantum objects or the reality thus idealize it at all, and thus, it follows, to have a conception of this reality.
Yet, this is not quite the final word on the subject. For the question then becomes that of whether our inability to do so only (A) characterizes the quantum-mechanical situation as things stand now, or (B) reflects the possibility that this reality is beyond the reach of our thought altogether, ever. While Bohr, thus, at least assumes (A) and while there are intimations that he entertained (B), he never stated so or even stated the possibility of this stronger form of RWR view, which leaves whether he assumed (B) or only assumed (A) to an interpretation. Logically, once (A) is the case, then (B) is possible too. I am not saying that (B) is necessary, but only that it is interpretively possible. There does not appear to be any experimental data compelling one to prefer either (A) or (B). Both views are in effect equivalent as far as physics is concerned. They are, however, different philosophically in defining how far our mind can, in principle, reach in investigating the ultimate constitution of nature. (B) puts more radical limits on this reach.
The qualification "as things stand now" applies, however, to (B) as well, even though it might appear otherwise given that this view precludes any conception of the ultimate reality not only now but also ever. It applies because a return to realism is possible, either on experimental or theoretical grounds. This return may take place either because quantum theory, as currently constituted, is replaced by an alternative theory that allows for a realist interpretation, or because (B), or for that matter (A), becomes obsolete even for those who hold it and is replaced by a more realist view with quantum theory in its present form. It is also possible, however, that the RWR view, either of (A) or (B) type, will remain viable in grounding our interpretations of QM or QFT, as long as these interpretations remain logically consistent and in accord with the experimental data of quantum physics and not in conflict with experimentally confirmed findings elsewhere.
The nature of the idealization of the ultimate constitution of physical reality in the RWR view of quantum phenomena and QM is very different from that used in classical mechanics, say, in terms of dimensionless massive points mathematically idealizing the motion of material objects in classical mechanics. Elementary particles, such as photons and electrons, are commonly seen as dimensionless, point-like entities (especially electrons or other charged elementary particles because, if they had volume, they would be torn apart by the electromagnetic force within them). They cannot, however, be considered as point particles in the sense of the idealization assumed in classical mechanics, and when they are understood in terms of quantum fields, this concept, too, is very different from that of classical or relativistic fields, such as an electromagnetic field. 11 This idealization is subtle because, while what is observable in or the observable parts themselves of measuring instruments is always uniquely (classically) defined, what can be considered as the object under investigation or what is considered as a measuring instrument (beyond its observable stratum) in a given experiment is not uniquely defined. This situation sometimes referred to as the arbitrariness of the "cut" or, because the term was favored by Heisenberg and J. von Neumann, the "Heisenberg-von-Neumann cut." As Bohr noted, however, while "it is true that the place within each measuring procedure where this discrimination [between the object and the measuring instrument] is made is … largely a matter of convenience," it is true only largely, but not completely. This is because "in each experimental arrangement and measuring procedure we have only a free choice of this place within a region where the quantum-mechanical description of the process concerned is effectively equivalent with the classical description" (Bohr 1935, p. 701) . In other words, the ultimate (RWR-type) constitution of the physical reality responsible for quantum phenomena observed in measuring instruments is always, in any possible experiment, on the other side of the cut. So are, as part of this reality, those quantum strata of the measuring instruments through which the latter interact with this reality. It is this reality, the reality that is always on the other side of the cut, that quantum objects and their behavior idealize at least in the present interpretation and, I would argue, Bohr's interpretation.
By virtue of their classical nature, then, the individual effects of the interaction between quantum objects and measuring instruments observed in quantum experiments can be isolated materially and phenomenally-we can perceive and analyze them as such, once the experiment is performed. By contrast, at the other end, the ultimate constitution of reality, idealized in terms of quantum objects and behavior, can never be isolated, either physically, insofar as we cannot observe this reality independently, or epistemologically, insofar as we cannot represent or even conceive of this reality. Bohr refers to this situation as the wholeness or indivisibility of quantum phenomena (Bohr 1987, pp. 51, 72-73) . This indivisibility precludes us from extracting the independent behavior of quantum objects or the (RWR-type) reality they idealize, thus making us no "longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object" as opposed to phenomena observed in any quantum experiment. 12 Bohr's insistence on the indispensability of classical physical concepts in considering the measuring instruments is often misunderstood, primarily due to insufficient attention to the architecture of Bohr's concepts, in particular by disregarding or missing that, as just explained, the structure of measuring instruments contains both classical and quantum strata. Even though what is observed as phenomena in quantum experiments is beyond the capacity of classical physics to account for them, the classical description can and, in order for us to be able to give an account of what happens in quantum experiments, must apply to the observable parts of measuring instruments. As Bohr said: "[W]e must recognize above all that, even when the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical theories, the account of the experimental arrangements and the recording of observations must be given in plain language, suitably supplemented by technical physical terminology" (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 72) . The instruments, however, also have quantum strata, through which they interact with quantum objects, leading to effects that "transcend the scope of classical physical theories." This interaction, which, as discussed in Section 3, is a form of entanglement, is quantum and thus cannot be observed or described as such. It is, in Bohr's words, "irreversibly amplified" to the macroscopic, classical level, say, a spot left on a silver screen (e.g., Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 73 ). Bohr, it is true, does not speak in terms of the quantum stratum of the apparatus, but the role of this stratum may be seen as a consequence of what he is saying about the interaction between the objects and the apparatus and the irreversible amplification of this interaction. For, how could an apparatus interact with a quantum object otherwise? In fact, as will be explained in Section 3 as well, what is so amplified in each case is not this interaction but the state of the quantum stratum of the apparatus after this interaction had taken place and the object under investigation is elsewhere. 13 As indicated earlier, the RWR view makes the absence of classical causality nearly automatic. This absence is stricly automatic if one places the ultimate nature of reality beyond conception altogether, because the assumption that this nature is classically causal would imply at least a partial conception of this reality. However, even if one adopts a weaker form of the RWR view, which only precludes a proper (and properly mathematized) representation of this reality, classical causality is still difficult to maintain in considering quantum phenomena. This is because to do so would require a degree of representation (analogous to that found in classical physics) that appears to be prevented, in particular, by the uncertainty relations, which are independent of QM. Schrödinger expressed this difficulty in his cat-paradox paper: "if a classical state does not exist at any moment, it can hardly change causally," where a classical state is defined by the (ideally) exact position and momentum of an object at any moment of time (Schrödinger 1935a, p. 154) . This, in turn, implies a different reason (from those found in classical physics) for our recourse to probability in quantum physics. According to Bohr:
[I]t is most important to realize that the recourse to probability laws [in quantum physics] is essentially different in aim from the familiar application of statistical considerations as practical means of accounting for the properties of mechanical systems of great structural complexity. In fact, in quantum physics we are presented not with intricacies of this kind, but with the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise the peculiar feature[s] of the elementary processes. (Bohr 1987, v.2, p. 34) Referring to "the peculiar feature of the elementary processes" has additional significance because, as explained earlier, in contrast to classical mechanics, exact predictions are no longer possible, even ideally or in principle, even in considering the behavior of the elementary quantum objects, "elementary particles." That is, exact predictions concerning the effects of their interactions with measuring instruments are no longer possible.
"The classical frame of concepts" may appear to refer to the concepts of classical physics, and this frame does include these concepts. However, by this time (in 1949), Bohr appears to adopt the RWR view, which places the ultimate nature of reality responsible for quantum phenomena beyond conception, at least as things stand now, and possibly (Bohr might not have been willing to go that far) beyond the reach of thought altogether, the position defined above as view (B). As explained, the qualification "as things stand now" still applies but in this case only insofar as this, (B), form itself of the RWR view may be abandoned by a future theory of quantum phenomena. This position gives the phrase "the classical frame of concepts" a broader meaning: all concepts that we can form (ordinary, physical, or philosophical) are classical. The question is only whether our concepts could one day become applicable in quantum theory or whatever can replace it.
Purely mathematical concepts are a possible exception. Indeed, realizing this, Heisenberg, eventually moved from a form of RWR view he adopted at the time of his discovery of QM to a form of mathematical realism in his later thinking, although he continued to maintain certain affinities with Bohr's views, in particular, by assuming that QM does not offer a physical description of quantum objects and behavior in space and time and that one cannot speak about them by using ordinary language and concepts (e.g., Heisenberg 1962, pp. 145, 178-179) . 14 Bohr, by contrast, equally rejected the possibility of a mathematical representation of quantum objects 13 The physical nature of this "amplification" is a separate matter and is part of the (unsolved) problem of the transition from the quantum to the classical, which and related subjects, such as "decoherence," are beyond my scope here. 14 See (Jaeger 2019) , for an assessment of Heisenberg's overall later views of QM, including in (Heisenberg 1962). and behavior, or, again, the reality they idealize, along with a physical one, in all versions of his interpretations, apart from a brief attempt at a more realist approach in the Como lecture (Bohr 1987, v. 1, pp. 52-91) . It is true that Bohr often speaks of quantum objects and behavior as being beyond our phenomenal, representational intuition, also involving visualization, sometimes used, including by Bohr, to translate the German word for intuition, Anschaulichkeit (e.g., Bohr 1987, v. 1 p. 51, 98-100, 108; v. 2, p. 59) . It is clear, however, that, apart from the Como lecture, Bohr saw the ultimate nature of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena as being beyond any representation and thus conception, including a mathematical one, or any possible analysis, at least as things stand now. As he said in his arguably most definitive statement on the subject: "In quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena, but with a recognition that such an analysis is in principle excluded" [beyond a certain point] (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 62) . By this point, Bohr defines atomic or quantum phenomena, strictly in terms effects, observed, in classically described parts of measuring instruments, as a result of their interaction with quantum objects or, again, the reality thus idealized. As he said on the same occasion:
I advocated the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to the observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole experimental arrangement. In such terminology, the observational problem is free of any special intricacy since, in actual experiments, all observations are expressed by unambiguous statements referring, for instance, to the registration of the point at which an electron arrives at a photographic plate. Moreover, speaking in such a way is just suited to emphasize that the appropriate physical interpretation of the symbolic quantum-mechanical formalism amounts only to predictions, of determinate or statistical character, pertaining to individual phenomena appearing under conditions defined by classical physical concepts [describing the relevant observable parts of measuring instruments]. (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 64) Referring, phenomenologically, to "observations," rather than, ontologically, to the observed situations themselves, explains Bohr's choice of the term "phenomenon," although it may still be better, in order to avoid any confusion, to speak of "quantum phenomena," thus defined. The key features of Bohr's concept are clearly apparent here, in particular, the fact that the term refers "to the observations obtained under specified circumstances," and hence, only to already registered phenomena. Because the observed parts of the measuring arrangement are described classically, phenomena and measuring instruments, as classical objects (as against, quantum objects, responsible for phenomena), could be considered as identical, as they always are in classical physics. By contrast, the emergence of these phenomena, which is due to the interaction between measuring instruments and quantum objects, or quantum objects and behavior themselves, are no longer available to a representation by means of QM or otherwise, at least as things stand now.
The epistemological cost of the RWR view is, again, not easily absorbed by many physicists and philosophers, and to some, beginning, famously, with Einstein, is outright unacceptable. This is not surprising because the features of quantum phenomena manifested in many famous experiments, such as, paradigmatically, the double-slit experiment, and those that led to RWRviews defy our basic assumptions concerning the workings of nature and thought. These assumptions, arising due to the neurological constitution of our brain, have served us for as long as human life itself, and within certain limits are unavoidable, including in physics, although, while respected by classical physics, they were already challenged by relativity. QM and then QFT have made this challenge much greater, albeit without entirely renouncing these features, which, in the RWR view, are applicable at levels other than that of the ultimate constitution of nature, specifically in describing by classical physics the behavior of measuring instruments.
Thus, it is natural and even humanly unavoidable to assume that something happens between observations, given changes that we observed in the physical states of the instruments used. Indeed, the sense that something happened is one of the most essential elements of human thought. However, in the RWR-type view, the assumption that "something happened" is at most provisional and ultimately inapplicable in considering the independent behavior of quantum objects, or again, the reality thus idealized. Anything that can actually happen, any quantum event, can only be encountered as manifested in the observable parts of measuring instruments, at which level classical concepts would apply. According to Heisenberg: There is no description of what happens to the system between the initial observation and the next measurement. …The demand to "describe what happens" in the quantum-theoretical process between two successive observations is a contradiction in adjecto, since the word "describe" [or "represent"] refers to the use of classical concepts, while these concepts cannot be applied in the space between the observations; they can only be applied at the points of observation. (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 47, 145; emphasis added) The same would apply to the word "happen" or "system," or any word we use, whatever concept it may designate, including, again, reality. Bohr is reported to have said: "We must never forget that 'reality' too is a human word" (Kalckar 1967, p. 234) . Although one should always be careful as concerns reported statements, especially by Bohr, this statement is in accord with his argumentation in his writings. While, as Bohr often noted, quantum physics cannot avoid using ordinary language, most especially in describing quantum experiments, it imposes new radical limits on our use of it. Our language and concepts cannot apply to quantum objects and behavior, or again, the reality they idealize, the reality of the ultimate constitution of nature, as understood by quantum theory in the RWR view. Heisenberg acknowledges these limits in the same book: "But the problems of language are really serious. We wish to speak in some way about the structure of the atoms and not only about 'facts'-the latter being, for instance, the black spots on a photographic plate or the water droplets in a cloud chamber. But we cannot speak about the atoms in ordinary language" (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 178-179; emphasis added) . Nor is it possible in terms of ordinary concepts, from which ordinary language is indissociable, or even in terms of physical concepts, assuming that they can ever be free from ordinary language and concepts. This is a formidable problem even if one adopts the RWR view. The term "reality" or "quantum object" (as idealizing the ultimate reality in question) does not pose a difficulty in this regard, because either term has no concept associated with it and hence does not belong to ordinary language and concepts, or even to physical concepts. In a way, either term function almost as a mathematical symbol. It is true that, as noted earlier, this view itself is not falsifiable, but then neither is any realist ontology of "the ultimate constitution of reality," which is only a human expression as well. A greater difficulty is the expression "quantum objects interact with each other" between experiments, for example, leading to an entanglement. As will be discussed in detail in the next section, in considering a measurement I shall speak of the interaction and entanglement between the quantum object and the quantum stratum of the instrument, which interaction takes place before anything is actually observed, as an effect of this interaction. Thus, this interaction, too, occurs before an observation. The way to handle this difficulty in the RWR view, still in provisional terms, is as follows. Although one makes an assumption, a nonfalsifiable assumption, of some form of relation between two or more quantum objects (which may include quantum strata of measuring instruments), there is no classical concept, such as "interaction" or even "relation," applicable to this "relation." There are only certain observable effects that are describable or numerically representable (some of which may be correlated) and that could be predicted by using the mathematical formalism of QM, specifically those parts of the formalism that we associate with both this assumption and the concept of entanglement (entangled state vectors). These predictions are falsifiable. How these effects come about remains beyond representation, including by such terms as "interaction" or "relations."
As noted above, the assumption that one cannot speak about the structure of atoms in ordinary language or even in terms of physical concepts, still allows for the mathematical representation of what happens between the experiments because mathematics is, as Heisenberg said on an earlier occasion, "fortunately" free from the limitations of ordinary language and concepts, fortunately because one could take advantage of this freedom, as Heisenberg did in creating QM, on which he commented at the time (Heisenberg 1930, p. 11) . At the time of his discovery of QM, Heisenberg, adopting a form of the RWR view, used this freedom to invent a theory, QM, designed to only predict the probabilities of events observed in quantum experiments. By contrast, in his later writings Heisenberg assumed the possibility of such a mathematical representation of the ultimate constitution of reality, while, thus giving his view a Platonist bent, excluding any other language or concepts, ordinary or even physical, as possibly applicable to this constitution (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 145, 167-186) . This possibility also reveals the importance of the qualification that the reality considered is only idealized in terms of quantum objects and behavior, because if this representation is strictly mathematical such physical concepts as behavior or even object, or quantum, may not apply. Heisenberg speaks of this representation in terms of symmetry groups and defines "elementary particles" accordingly, which is to say, without considering them as "particles" in any physical sense, which is a form of the RWR view. On the other hand, the concept of elementary can be given a mathematical sense insofar as the corresponding representation of the symmetry group considered is irreducible (Wigner 1939) . For Bohr, a mathematical representation of this reality is, again, assumed to be no more possible that a physical one, at least as things stand now, an assumption adopted in this paper as well.
Thus, in RWR-type interpretations, QM is incomplete by Einstein's criterion of completeness, because it offers no representation of the ultimate constituents of nature and their individual behavior. I shall call theories they do so "Einstein-complete," in parallel with the Einstein-local, and Einstein wanted fundamental theories to be both (the combination referred to as local realism), and ideally, to be causal or even deterministic. As indicated earlier, however, QM may be seen, and was by Bohr, as complete in a different sense, which I shall term "Bohr-complete." It is as complete a theory of (nonrelativistic) quantum phenomena as nature allows a theory of these phenomena to be, as things stand now. There is no change in this respect: QM remains our standard theory of these phenomena. While QM is quantum-nonlocal in arguably any interpretation, it is or at least may be interpreted as Einstein-local.
What does a quantum measurement measure and what does a quantum theory predict?
According to Bohr, then, "the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instruments which in principle cannot be taken into account" precludes us from being able to separate the behavior of quantum objects from this interaction and to represent this behavior independently in the way it is possible to do in classical physics or relativity (Bohr 1935, p. 697 ).
In fact, as Bohr eventually came to realize (although he did not use the term entanglement) and as I shall explain here, in any given experiment, the quantum object under investigation and the measuring instrument used (or more accurately, as explained earlier, the quantum stratum of this instrument, by means of which it interacted with the object) become entangled. I say this keeping in mind the qualifications made earlier concerning the provisional nature of using, in RWR-type interpretations, the term "interaction" or "entanglement" as referring to the independent behavior of quantum objects, including the quantum strata of measuring instruments, because there is no conception that we can form that would be rigorously applicable to this "interaction" or this "entanglement." We can only rigorously define "entanglement" in terms of the mathematical formalism of QM and make the corresponding predictions by using this formalism, supplemented by Born's rule, which is not inherent in the formalism. With this qualification in mind, the entanglement, in each measurement, between the quantum object considered and the measuring instrument used defines quantum measurement and enables us, by using QM, or some of other theory, to predict probabilistically (no other predictions are, again, possible on experimental grounds) the outcomes of certain other possible experiments, observed strictly in measuring instruments. Which outcomes can be predicted depends on what measurement we perform, say, that of the momentum, which allows us to predict (probabilistically or statistically) the outcomes of future momentum measurements, but, in view of the uncertainty relations or complementarity, irrevocably precludes making the position measurement at the same moment of time and, thus, making any predictions concerning future position measurements. We can make a position measurement at a later point in time, but its outcome cannot be predicted, if only the momentum measurement was made. One needs a position measurement to do so.
It follows that any possible future phenomenon, once the corresponding experiment is performed (otherwise it is not a phenomenon in Bohr's definition, which I adopt here) is thus always discrete in relation to the one defined by the initial measurement enabling predicting this phenomenon without any physical process connecting them. At least no such process can be assumed given that we are no "longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behavior of the physical object" between observations, which also precludes classical causality. By the same token, our predictions are always predictions at a distance, are quantum-nonlocal. On the other hand, there is no need to assume an action at a distance, which allows to see these predictions Einstein-local, although they are, again, sometimes interpreted in terms of One deals here with the entanglement of the quantum object and the measuring instrument (physically the quantum stratum of the measuring instrument), as two quantum systems, in contrast to an interaction of two classical systems, the object and the instrument, which defines classical measurement. In the classical case, we can disregard or properly control the interference of a measuring instrument, and treat a given classical object as a single independent system, and also simultaneously establish the position of the object, because the interference of the measuring device enabling this position measurement in not affected by the measurement of the object's momentum, and could be disregarded as well. In the case of a classical momentum measurement, we thus measure the momentum of the object itself or at least may, ideally and in principle, assume that we do, while, as I shall explain presently, in quantum measurement we in fact measure the momentum of the instrument after its interaction with the object, the interaction that entangles them. By the same token, in classical mechanics (in considering individual or small systems, apart 15 There are arguments for the possibility of classical causality and, in the first place, realism in the case of discrete events (e.g., Sorkin 1991; Smolin 2018, pp. 257-261) . In my view, these arguments pose significant problems, beginning with that of explaining the mechanism by means of which classical causality can be established in a discrete set. It is not clear that it is possible to conceive of such mechanism apart from assuming that connections between events are continuous, which assumption grounds classical causality in classical physics, relativity, and elsewhere. This problem is circumvented in the RWR view, by precluding a representation of how the phenomena considered come about and how such predictions are possible, which, admittedly, cannot satisfy those who want realism. from chaotic ones), we can predict both the momentum and the position ideally exactly, deterministically, at any future point of time once we have established them at a given point, and can LAO reconstitute the value of both in the pastP. This is never possible in the case of quantum phenomena, in view of the uncertainty relations, even if one assumes that both variables can actually be assigned to quantum objects themselves, as in the case of Bohmian mechanics. By the same token, QM only gives us information, in general probabilistic, about the future, and never about the past, as each new measurement makes all preceding measurements meaningless as concern our predictions after this new measurement has taken place. As Schrödinger said, in considering quantum measurement in terms of entanglement in his cat-paradox paper, "the rejection of realism … imposes obligations" (Schrödinger 1935, p. 158) . While Schrödinger, disparagingly, saw QM, at least in an RWR-type of interpretation, as "a doctrine born of distress" (Schrödinger 1935, p. 154) , he offered important insights into this "doctrine" in most of its aspects: nonrealism (even though he stopped short of reaching a fullfledged RWR view), discreteness, quantum nonlocality, and most especially entanglement, the concept he introduced there in both German (Verschrankung) and English. He also addressed complementarity, even if without using the term. As he said:
From the standpoint of the classical model the momentary statement content of the y-function is far from a complete description. From the new standpoint it must be complete [as complete as possible]. It must be impossible to add to it additional correct statements, without otherwise changing it. … Thence it follows that two different catalogs, that apply to the same system under different conditions or at different times, may well partially overlap but never so that one is entirely contained within the other. For otherwise it would be susceptible to completion through additional correct statements, namely through those by which the other one exceeds the first.-The mathematical structure of the theory automatically satisfy this condition. There is no y-function that furnishes exactly the same statements as another and in addition several more statements. (Schrödinger 1935, p. 159; translation slightly modified) "Complete" refers here Bohr-completeness: QM is as complete as nature allows us to have in accordance with all experimental data available (and is consistent with other theories, such as relativity included, implying Einstein-locality), at least as things stand now. If one adopts the RWR view, the interaction between the object and the measuring instrument, and the resulting momentum measurement only helps us to have an expectation-catalog, provided by the formalism, say, y-function (cum Born's rule), for possible future momentum measurements. This catalog is exhaustive: it cannot be supplemented by a catalog for future position measurements, as reflected in the uncertainty relations and complementarity. In some cases, such as those of the EPR-type, the corresponding predictions could even be made with probability one, and moreover, on basis of a measurement performed not on the object for which the prediction is made but another object, with which that objects previously interacted. Still, in contrast to classical physics, these predictions can only concern either one or the other complementary variables, but never both together in the same experiment. In addition, as discussed below, they do not guarantee that the predicted value corresponds to the reality that will obtain in the future measurement thus predicted, unless this measurement is actually performed, because one can always perform a complementary measurement at that future moment in time. They are still only predictions and are not statements defining what is real, or is guaranteed to be real, as they may, in principle, be in classical physics.
The nature of an interaction between the object and the measuring apparatus (technically, again, the corresponding quantum stratum of the apparatus) as an entanglement contains important further features. This interaction itself is not measurement: it occurs before the measurement takes place, even if usually, but not always (as it can be delayed), quickly following this interaction.
Once performed, the measurement, say, that of the momentum, disentangles the object and the instrument, with the observed outcome "irreversibly amplified" to the level of the classically observed stratum of the apparatus (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 73 ). This outcome is actually associated with the quantum stratum of the apparatus after the interaction rather than to the object, a crucial point, discussed below. It is this disentangling that, like in any other case of entanglement, enables us to predict, by using QM, the probability that the next momentum measurement at a given point of time will be within a certain range (Schrödinger 1935, pp. 162-163) . Alternatively, if the initial measurement was that of the position, one could predict the probability that a future position measurement will locate the position within a certain area. This future measurement will create a new entanglement, which will enable future predictions, but the expectation-catalog for them will be different and will depriving the previous expectation-catalog of any value for predictions after this new measurement (Schrödinger 1935, pp. 159-160) .
Observed quantum phenomena, which disentangle the entanglements between objects and instruments, are never entangled. Only quantum objects and their representative y-functions are.
But we can never observe either: quantum objects because they can never be physically observed in themselves, and y-functions because they never represent either quantum objects apart measurement or measurements, at least in the RWR view. Indeed, y-functions never represent measurements even if one takes a realist view of them as representing what happens between measurements. A measurement makes a y-function "collapse" or, in Schrödinger's more precise language, which also better fits the RWR view, "it is no more." (Schrödinger 1935, p. 161) . The language of collapse suggests and usually represents a realist position, according to which yfunction is part of the physical representation of the independent behavior of quantum objects. On the other hand, in the RWR view, because a y-function is only part of the mathematical machinery enabling us to have our expectation-catalogs, once the measurement associated with the expectation-catalog defined by a previous measurement and the y-function used for creating this catalog is performed, this y-function is no longer of any use for future predictions. A new yfunction is necessary for the catalog defined by this new measurement. The special circumstances of the EPR experiment allow us to make such predictions with probability one, but the complementary nature of the predictions concerning the variables in question, such as the momentum and the position (or the opposite direction of the spin in the Bohm-Bell version of the experiment for spin), will still be in place. Both are never possible within the same experiment, which fact, while, as Bohr argued, underappreciated by EPR, grounded Bohr's argument in his reply to EPR, on both counts, the completeness and the Einstein-locality, of QM, although the predictions involved are quantum-nonlocal, are predictions at a distance. As I shall explain below, however, one can ideally reconstitute the EPR case from the standard measurement case, by making simple additional measurements, only ideally because the special ideal state used in the EPR experiment for continuous variables is not normalizable, which prevents the corresponding experiment from being actually performed.
In contrast to the EPR-type situation (where, as a result, we can make predictions with probability one), in general we don't know the entangled state, say, again, defined by the yfunction, of the composite system consisting of the object and the quantum stratum of measuring instrument involved. This is because the measurement immediately disentangles this state, thus enabling us to compile the corresponding expectation-catalog concerning future possible experiments for the desired variable, while, again, depriving us of doing so for a complementary variable. Any prediction in this catalog is quantum nonlocal, a prediction at a distance, because at the time of measurement the object in question is elsewhere, and thus any prediction concerning it is a prediction at a distance, without, as in the classical case, having a physical description and the corresponding mathematical representation of the process connecting these two events. A yfunction (cum Born's rule) may provide a catalog for predictions at any point on the temporal continuum, but it only provides a catalog for possible measurements, and not a continuous mathematical representation of the process that leads to a future measurement. All quantum phenomena are, thus, discrete in relation to each other, a discreteness that implies quantum nonlocality, predictions at a distance, without implying an action at a distance. Quantum nonlocality could, again, be interpreted in this Einstein-nonlocal way, but need not be. The deeper essence of this situation is revealed by the fact, noted by Bohr, that, because the measurement as such physically takes place after the interactions between the object and the apparatus has already occurred, the alternative, complementary, measurement is always possible following the same interaction between and entangling the object and the instrument. In other words, this interaction and this entanglement does not by itself define the measurement (which disentangles the entanglement) that one can perform. Instead, it allows for either of the two complementarity measurements to be performed after this interaction, although both measurements can never be performed together in the same experimental arrangement. These two facts define the complementarity of these two measurements and the resulting phenomena. Each measurement requires a different experimental arrangement, which, it follows, can be made after this interaction has already take place. According to Bohr:
After a preliminary measurement of the momentum of the diaphragm [with slits through which a particle can pass, as in the double-slit experiment], we are in principle offered the choice, when an electron or photon has passed through the slit, either to repeat the momentum measurement or to control the position of the diaphragm and, thus, to make predictions pertaining to alternative subsequent observations. It may also be added that it obviously makes no difference, as regards observable effects obtainable by a definitive experimental arrangement, whether our plans of considering or handling the instruments are fixed beforehand or whether we prefer to postpone the completion of our planning until a later moment when the particle is already on its way from one instrument to another. (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 57) The first point confirms that each type of measurement or the corresponding prediction requires a separate specified arrangement, which grounds most of Bohr's responses to Einstein's criticism of QM, including in the case of EPR's argument. It might be added, given that the point is not made by Bohr himself, that this requirement also implies that one needs two separate quantum objects to realize both measurements and the corresponding predictions, again, central to Bohr's countering EPR's argument. Bohr's second, subtler, point, which is under discussion at the moment, is that it is always possible, without affecting the observable effects, "to postpone the completion of our planning until a later moment when the particle is already on its way from one instrument to another." This observation also anticipates the possibility of Wheeler's delayed choice experiment, in fact presented by Wheeler via Bohr's (ultimate) interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, in terms of his concept of phenomenon (Wheeler 1983, pp. 182-192) .
If, then, one makes either measurement after the object has left the location of the measurement after interacting with the instrument and is on the way to another possible measurement, what does, then, one measure, given that the object itself is no longer here to be measured? One measures the state of the measuring instrument, either its momentum or its position, as both, again, can never be measured in the same arrangement. 16 More accurately, either measurement reflects the state of the quantum stratum of the instrument, which interacted with the object in the past (however recently, but always in the past), the state amplified to the classical level of the observation, to which and only to which even such concepts as "momentum" or "position" can rigorously apply in the RWR view of the situation. However, given that one can perform either measurement after the object has left the location of the apparatus, one can ascertain, regardless of an interpretation, both key features in question: (a) that one can perform either measurement concerning the state of the quantum stratum of the apparatus, with the outcome amplified to the classical level of the observable part of this instrument; and correlatively (b) a quantum-nonlocal nature of any possible prediction, based in either measurement thus performed, concerning any future measurement.
One might assume (without affecting how the experiments are performed or how formalism is used), say, in the case of the momentum measurement, the exchange of momenta between the object and the instrument, that the momentum of the object will correspond to the difference between two momentum measurement of the instruments and, thus, "measure" the momentum of the object itself (e.g., von Neumann 1932, p. 355) . Physically, however, we never measure that momentum, given, first, that, the object has already left the location of measurement, and secondly, that we could have performed instead the position measurement. The same applies to measurement that verify our predictions, which are always recorded corresponding to the state of the measuring instrument, by an amplification from the corresponding quantum stratum of the instrument to the observable classical part of it. This is why, in the RWR view, no physical properties, such as position and the momentum, are assumed to be applied to quantum objects or to the reality thus idealized, but only to the observed, classically described, parts of measuring instruments.
One is, thus, using the outcome of the measurement representing the state of the apparatus to predict, quantum-nonlocally, by means of the y-function (cum Born's rule), a possible outcome of a future measurement on or, rather, again, involving the object, without "in any way disturbing the system," just as we would in the EPR type experiment (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138) . It is true that there was an interaction between the object and the instrument before that measurement. But this is also the case for the two objects of the EPR pair, which have been in an interaction, which entangled them, before the last stage of measurement on one or the other object of the pair, which enables us to make a prediction concerning the other. It is important to keep in mind that such quantum-nonlocal predictions of complementarity variables require, in either the standard or the EPR case, two different specified arrangements (and two different objects) to perform both experiments, in accordance with how we decide to set the apparatus. As discussed in Section 5, EPR, in using the phrase "without in any way disturbing the system," do not take these circumstances into account, which allows Bohr to argue that EPR's use of this phrase is ambiguous and is in fact inapplicable in the EPR experiment, at least without additional qualifications.
In the case of the standard, rather than EPR-type, case, our predictions are, again, not with probability one, but the essence of the situation is the same. Indeed, with some simple additional arrangements, following the first measurement, one can reproduce the (idealized) EPR case, which led Bohr to realize the essential parallel between the EPR experiment and the standard quantum measurement (Bohr 1935, pp. 699-700; Bohr 1938, pp. 101-103; Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 60) . The nature of the initial interaction as an entanglement is, however, most crucial here, as Schrödinger realized. Bohr did not use the language of entanglement, but the situation is the one of entanglement between the object and the measuring instrument, technically, again, the quantum discussed here, Schrödinger's analysis of quantum measurement in his cat-paradox paper does not consider this point (Schrödinger 1935, pp. 158-159) . Von Neumann's analysis comes close to this point, and, while it is conceivable that von Neumann realized it, he did not expressly make this point as such (von Neumann 1932, pp. 355-356 ). stratum of it through which it interacted with the object. In any event, even in the standard quantum measurement, we are unavoidably dealing not only with the object under investigation, as in classical physics (because there we can disregard the role of measuring instruments), but with a composite entangled quantum system, consisting of the object and the measuring instrument. 17 To return to Schrödinger's idiom, the unknown "quantum state" (the unknown y-function) of the combined entangled system, the object and the measuring instrument (again, its corresponding quantum stratum), resulting from their interaction allows one to make, after this interaction and hence when the object is elsewhere either of the two complementary measurements, determining either of the two complementary quantities. Each would allow one to compile, by means of a yfunction, the corresponding catalog for future possible measurements. This makes it tempting to think that both quantities are "already there" to be measured and a combined catalog encompassing both is to be formed, which would make QM incomplete because it does not allow for such a possibility, as there are, as we have seen, no such expectation-catalogs (Schrödinger 1935, p. 159) . A similar type of thinking-thinking defined by the view that, because either measurement could in fact be performed after the interaction between the object and the instrument has already taken place, the object or the quantum part of the instrument that interacted with the object in fact possesses both properties-is found in several of Einstein's arguments concerning thought experiments he proposed, including the EPR experiment. The latter makes the situation more pronounced because it involves a system consisting of two entangled quantum objects, rather than the entanglement between a single object and the instrument. As explained, however, the case is essentially the same, primarily because in either case there is no specifiable experimental arrangement that would allow one to establish both quantities. Either is not the same as both. One can assume that quantum objects possess both variables. There is, however, no experiment (because each measurement requires a separate, differently specified, arrangement, incompatible with the other) and, thus, no way to claim that one can actually predict more than QM can predict and thus to prove it incomplete in this sense of "not exhausting the possibilities of observation," Bohr-incomplete (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p, 57) . This reasoning governs Bohr's reply to EPR.
The entanglement between the object and the measuring instrument, as any entanglement, allows one to potentially have more probabilistic knowledge that an actually performed measurement can, probabilistic because Schrödinger, again, notes in this case "each individual statement or item of knowledge is after all a probabilistic statement" (Schrödinger 1935, p. 160 ). An entanglement is always "an entanglement of predictions" and, as "an entanglement of our knowledge" is only that of probabilistic knowledge, even if sometimes these predictions are made with probability one (Schrödinger 1935, p. 160) . The determinate knowledge is only given by a measurement, and then there is no longer any entanglement, unless of course it is a future one that happens after a measurement, but such a new entanglement will only be an entanglement of predictions. In the present situation (of the entanglement between the quantum object under investigation and the measuring instrument used), this entanglement allows one to potentially establish two expectations-catalogs, because either disentangling measurement can be performed. But it does not ever allow one to ever actually have a single encompassing expectation-catalog. As noted earlier, there is no such encompassing catalog. In this case, the two catalogs are mutually exclusive and, thus, require two mutually exclusive arrangements, and two separate quantum objects or, as in the EPR case, pairs, to realize these catalogs.
This potentiality of having either catalog is a subtle illustration of Schrödinger's claim that "the best possible knowledge of a whole does not necessarily include the same for its parts," which and thus entanglement itself, he sees as "the great difference over against the classical model theory," in fact, in his view, the defining trait of quantum physics (Schrödinger 1935, p. 161 ; emphasis added). I shall not discuss this point as such here, except by reiterating that it is crucial that this knowledge is only a possible knowledge. This is crucial because it is, again, never possible to have an expectation-catalog that can encompass two alternative expectation-catalogs that the entanglement of the objects and the instruments potentially enables. This potentiality could only be actualized as one of the two possible mutually exclusive events and two mutually exclusive sets or catalogs of predictions concerning future events that may follow each of these events. Understanding quantum measurement in terms of entanglement and the resulting parallel with the EPR case, again, reveals that in any quantum experiment we always consider composite interactive systems consisting of at least two systems, and never a single system. 18 The situation also amplifies the nonlocal nature of quantum prediction. This is because deciding, after the interaction on one or the other complimentary measurement, made at time t1 enables alternative, mutually exclusive, predictions concerning a distant object, or rather a distant experiment, at time t2, and neither measurement any longer requires interference with the object, because the latter has already left the location of the instrument. In contrast to classical physics, there is no way to ascertain that both variables can ever be assigned, because this assignment would require representing the behavior of the object independently of its interaction with measuring instruments, which is never possible. These circumstances make this interaction, irreducible in quantum physics, correlative to the nonlocal nature of quantum predictions, spooky predictions at a distance, while maintaining Einstein-locality, and thus avoiding a spooky action at a distance. One can at time t2 perform an alternative complementary measurement on the object. This will, however, disable the possibility of ascertaining the value of the first complementary variable and disable the original prediction. This is part of the conceptual architecture of complementarity, which I shall now discuss.
Complementarity and Quantum Causality
The main lineament of Bohr's concept of complementarity, especially as referring to the mutually exclusive nature of certain quantum phenomena, should be apparent from the preceding discussion. Defined arguably most generally, complementarity is characterized by:
(a) a mutual exclusivity of certain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and yet (b) the possibility of considering each one of them separately at any given point; and (c) the necessity of considering all of them at different moments for a comprehensive account of the totality of phenomena that one must consider in quantum physics. The concept was never quite given by Bohr a single definition of this type. However, the characterization just stated may be surmised from several of Bohr's statements, such as the following one: "Evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena [some of which are mutually exclusive] exhaust the possible information about the objects" (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 40) . In the RWR view, this information is, again, comprised of the data observed in measuring instruments, which defines quantum phenomena in Bohr's sense, as effects of the interaction between measuring instruments and quantum objects, or the reality that quantum object idealize. This reality is beyond knowledge or even conception and about it we can, thus, have no information of any kind. Parts (b) and (c) of this definition are just as important as part (a), and disregarding them often leads to misunderstandings. The fact that at any given point either of the two complementary measurements could be performed and the corresponding phenomenon established is just as crucial as the mutual exclusivity of the two complementary phenomena considered. That we have a free, or at least a sufficiently free, choice concerning what kind of experiment we want to perform is part of the very idea of experiment in science, including in classical physics (Bohr 1935, p. 699) . However, in contrast to classical physics (or relativity), in quantum physics implementing our decision concerning what we want to do enables us to make certain types of possible predictions and will irrevocably exclude certain other, complementary, types of predictions, all probabilistic or statistical in character, in accordance with the uncertainty relations, which are statistical in character as well. The uncertainty relations are not the same as complementarity, but they can be given, as they were by Bohr, an interpretation in terms of complementarity and Bohr's concept of quantum phenomenon. Thus, if one makes a position measurement, one can, probabilistically or (if one repeats the same measurement) statistically make, or form an expectation-catalog for, predictions concerning future position measurements, say, as registered by a spot on the screen, which, by the same token, precludes one from making any predictions, or forming an expectationcatalog, concerning future momentum measurements on the same object.
Rather than arbitrarily selecting one or other part of physical reality, as in the case of classical mechanics, our decisions actively shape what can be predicted, even if not always what can actually happen in the future, and preclude the complementary alternative for making future predictions. I qualify, because, as indicated earlier, if, say, on the basis of the momentum measurement at time t1, one made a prediction concerning a momentum measurement at time t2, which prevents one from making any predictions concerning the position of the objects at t2, one could still perform the position measurement at t2, thus not only depriving one of the possibility of verifying the original prediction but also alternatively defining the reality at t2. While, however, this fact tell us that our decision cannot give us certainty concerning what will happen, what may or may not happen in quantum experiments still depends on us. It is defined by our decision of what experiment to perform, because unlike in classical physics, we cannot assume that both measurements represent parts of the same single reality.
Speaking in classical terms, one could say that there are only parts which no longer add up to a whole of the type found in classical physics. The very essence of complementarity is, however, that one cannot, at least in the RWR-type of interpretation, think in classical terms, even though we can use the corresponding variables themselves classically in describing the behavior of measuring instruments. We can never apply both of them (the position and the momentum) at the same time, because the uncertainty relation and complementarity apply to measuring instruments, and only to them. Each measurement creates the only reality there is, defined by our decision of which measurement to perform, and the alternative decision would establish the other reality, with the ultimate level of either reality manifested only in its effects observed in measuring instruments, in the reality of measuring instruments, thus, stratifying the reality considered. By the same token, each measurement defines what we can and (by complementarity) cannot predict concerning future reality and thus predict what might happen. Again, however, a measurement cannot define what will happen, what will be real, which can only be defined by another measurement, and one can always perform an alternative measurement (complementary to the one the outcome of which was predicted) at this future point and thus define a different reality from the one predicted.
It may be observed, with these considerations in mind, that wave-particle complementarity, with which the concept of complementarity is associated most commonly, had never played a significant role in Bohr's thinking, first of all, because Bohr was always acutely aware of the difficulties of applying either concept to quantum objects. Bohr's solution to the dilemma of whether quantum objects are particles or waves was that they were neither. Instead, either "picture" refers to one of the two complementary sets of discrete individual effects of the interactions between quantum objects and measuring instruments, particle-like effects, which may be individual or collective, or wave-like effects, which are always collective, while composed of discrete individual effects. The example of the latter are "interference" effects, composed of the large number of discrete traces of the collisions between the quantum objects and the photographic screen, in the double-slit experiment in the corresponding setup (when both slits are open and there are no means to allow us to know, even in principle, through which slit each object has passed).
The concept of complementarity is better exemplified by complementarities of space-time coordination and the application of momentum or energy conservation laws. There are two complementarities here: the first is that of the position and momentum measurements, and the second is that of the time and the energy measurements. These complementarities are correlative to Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and establish Bohr's interpretation of them. Technically, the uncertainty relations, DqDp @ h (where q is the coordinate, p is the momentum in the corresponding direction), only prohibit the simultaneous exact measurement of both variables, which is always possible, at least ideally and in principle, in classical physics, also allowing one to maintain classical causality there. As Bohr said, in his reply to EPR:
In the phenomena concerned [including those of the EPR type] we are not dealing with an incomplete description characterized by the arbitrary picking out of different elements of physical reality at the cost of [sacrificing] other such elements, but with a rational discrimination between essentially different experimental arrangements and procedures which are suited either for an unambiguous use of the idea of space location, or for a legitimate application of the conservation theorem of momentum. Any remaining appearance of arbitrariness concerns merely our freedom of handling the measuring instruments, characteristic of the very idea of experiment. (Bohr 1935, p. 699) This situation is clearly defined by the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena, here mutually exclusive ones, in contradistinction to classical physics, where such "elements of reality" as the position and the momentum can always be attributed simultaneously to the object itself under investigation. Bohr borrows the phrase "elements of reality" from EPR's paper, in responding to which this point is made (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138) .
By the same token, the uncertainty relations are not a manifestation of the limited accuracy of measuring instruments, because, as noted, they would be valid even if we had perfect instruments. In Bohr's interpretation, the uncertainty relations make each type of measurement involved in them complementary: mutually exclusive yet allowing us a freedom of performing either of them at any moment in time. Furthermore, in Bohr's interpretation, one not only cannot measure both variables simultaneously but also cannot define them simultaneously. According to Bohr: "the statistical character of the uncertainty relations in no way originates from any failure of measurement to discriminate within a certain latitude between classically describable states of the objects, but rather expresses an essential limitation of applicability of classical ideas to the analysis of quantum phenomena" (Bohr 1938, p. 100) . As he said elsewhere: "we are of course not concerned with a restriction as to the accuracy of measurement, but with a limitation of the well-defined application of space-time concepts and dynamical conservation laws, entailed by the necessary distinction between measuring instruments and atomic objects" (Bohr 1987, v. 3, p. 5) . This limitation is defined by the complementary nature of these two applications. The situation is correlative to the necessary recourse to probability or statistics in considering quantum phenomena, due to "the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise the peculiar feature[s] of the elementary processes" (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 34) . Thus, although classical concepts do apply to quantum phenomena, their application there is limited by the uncertainty relations and complementarity.
Complementarity may, thus, be seen as a reflection of the fact that, in a radical departure from classical physics or relativity, the behavior of quantum objects of the same type, say, electrons, is not governed, individually or collectively, by the same physical law, in all possible contexts, specifically in complementary contexts. Speaking of "physical law" in this connection requires caution, because, in Bohr's interpretation, there is no physical law representing this behavior, and even no probabilistic law concerning the outcomes of individual quantum experiments. The behavior of quantum objects leads to mutually incompatible observable physical effects in complementary contexts, which are probabilistic or statistical in nature. On the other hand, the mathematical formalism of QM offers correct probabilistic or statistical predictions (no other predictions are, again, possible) in all contexts. 19 Hence, as I argue here, as a quantum-theoretical concept, complementarity acquires probabilistic or statistical aspects, as well as, ultimately, mathematical aspects (because one needs mathematics to make these predictions), rarely addressed in considering complementarity. Khrennikov's articles (Khrennikov 2019b (Khrennikov , 2019c ) is a welcome exception as concerns probability. Indeed, complementarity may be seen, as it was by Bohr, as a probabilistic or statistical generalization of the idea of causality in the absence of classical causality. Bohr never explained the nature of this generalization, but it can be understood by means of the concept of quantum causality, introduced by this author previously (Plotnitsky 2011 , Plotnitsky 2016 , pp. 206-206, Plotnitsky 2018a ). On this occasion, however, while still considering it in general, I shall relate it more firmly to complementarity. I define "quantum causality" as the probabilistic or statistical determination of what may happen in a possible future observation (it need not be, technically, a measurement), at time t2 as a result of what has happened previously happened as a quantum event, for example, that of the measurement defined by our decision concerning which experiment to perform at a given moment in time, t1. Both emphasized phrases are crucial because, as explained earlier, one can, at t2, perform an alternative measurement and thus, by another decision, establish a reality different from the one predicted at t1, even if this prediction was made, as in EPR-type experiments, (ideally) with probability one. Thus, one can, on the basis of the position measurement at t1, make a prediction concerning an outcome of a possible position measurement at t2 and then perform instead a momentum measurement at t2. However, because this alternative outcome could not have been predicted at the time when the initial measurement was made and is not a result of our decision made in performing the initial experiment, the definition of quantum causality just given remains intact. Whatever is registered as a quantum event defines a possible set of, probabilistically or statistically, predictable future events, as outcomes of a certain set of possible future experiments, and by complementary, precludes certain other types of predictions, although it is, again, not possible to establish the reality thus predicted at the time, t2, for which the prediction is made. This can only be done by a measurement at t2, and because an alternative measurement can be performed, a reality different from the predicted one could be brought about at t2. All such predictions are, again, quantum-nonlocal, are predictions at a distance, but they respect Einstein-locality and thus preclude any physical action at a distance.
Quantum causality is a fundamentally probabilistic concept. In contrast to classical causality, in which case what has happened determines what will happen, in effect connecting all events involved in a single causal chain or network (even though, due to our lack of knowledge of how this happens, our predictions could still be probabilistic), quantum causality determines what may (or may not) happen, and not what will happen, possibly, and in the RWR view definitively, in the absence of the underlying classically causal connections between events. Classical causality is ontological or realist, while quantum causality is, in RWR-type interpretations, while it arises by virtue of quantum reality as an RWR-type reality, is probabilistic and as such is epistemological. It pertains strictly to our interactions with the world by means of our experimental technology and our thinking. It has to do with our knowledge, even though the nature of quantum probability itself is nonepistemic, because the recourse to probability is not due to the lack of our knowledge concerning how quantum events ultimately come about. The knowledge pertaining to quantum causality only concerns the data obtained in already performed experiments (or other quantum events, which may be seen as experiments performed by nature) and possible probabilistic predictions concerning future event, with both type of data being manifested strictly in phenomena (in Bohr's sense), either already registered or possibly to be registered in the future. In the RWR view, there is, again, no knowledge or even conception of the reality responsible for what is so observed. The recourse to probability is, again, not due to the lack of knowledge concerning the nature of reality, a classically causal reality, as in classical statistical physics, but is due to the ultimate nature of this reality itself, which is of RWR-type and hence cannot be classically causal. If one reverts to classical mechanics, our predictions concerning individual objects become, ideally, deterministic and, correlatively, there is no complementarity.
This definition of quantum causality is in accord with recent views of causality in quantum information theory (e.g., Brukner 2014; Hardy 2010, D'Ariano 2018), except that it expressly brings in complementarity, rarely considered in these arguments. M. G. D'Ariano, in (D'Ariano 2018), defines causality in physics in general by means of this type of concept, which is also consistent with complementarity, although the latter is not expressly addressed by D'Ariano in this context. Classical causality as defined here or determinism (the term used by D'Ariano as essentially equivalent to classical causality) is merely a special case of causality in this probabilistic sense, the case which allows for ideally exact predictions in classical mechanics. This is a justifiable view and an important concept, providing a very general definition of causality, applicable beyond quantum physics or even physics. The concept of quantum causality as defined here may be generalized in the way as well, although such generalization may not involve complementarity in the way quantum causality does in quantum physics. I adopt the term "quantum causality" rather than speak of "causality" as such, as D'Ariano does, in part for historical reasons, given the previous use of the term causality in the sense of classical causality, although it is inviting and effective to see classical causality just as a limit case of probabilistic causality found in quantum theory. In addition, quantum causality as defined here and, to begin with, the renunciation of classical causality (a realist concept) are grounded in the RWR view. While D'Ariano's concept is consistent with the RWR view or allows for an RWRtype interpretation, it does not appear that D'Ariano subscribes to the RWR view in this or related articles, but instead adopts a form of mathematical ontology akin to that of Heisenberg in his later works, as mentioned earlier (e.g., D'Ariano 2017). This is a possible and in many ways attractive position, which also has certain affinities (which is not to say coincides) with structural realism (e.g., Ladyman 2016). As I said from the outset, it is not my aim here to refute this view or other ontological views, even those that I find far less attractive but only to advocate a perhaps (perhaps!) more probable alternative. Thus, the RWR view may be seen in terms of structural nonrealism (Plotnitsky 2018b) . Besides, as indicated in discussing Heisenberg's views, this position, at least, in Heisenberg's and D'Ariano's cases, may still be seen as a form of reality without realism, insofar as there is no physical concept that can capture this ultimate nature of reality, thus suggesting an interpretation of D'Ariano's title, "Physics without physics," of (D'Ariano 2017). I am not attributing this interpretation to D'Ariano, but only suggesting it as a possible interpretation. D'Ariano's concept is expressly linked to the arrow of time. The arrow of time is, however, also part of quantum causality as defined here. It may be added that, although the case is not considered by D'Ariano, performing a measurement of the type alternative to the initial measurement and the corresponding future predicted by it can only happen at a future moment, which preserves the arrow of time at the level of phenomena. In the present, RWR-type, view, the arrow of time is only manifested classically in the observable phenomena. D'Ariano, on the other hand, appears to see the arrow of time as found in the ultimate workings of reality responsible for quantum (or classical) phenomena, at least in (D'Ariano 2018), although it is possible that he would accept the present view, at least as a legitimate alternative.
Importantly, the present view does not imply that at the ultimate level of reality there is no change or multiplicity but only permanence and oneness. This view is sometimes found in literature (e.g., Barbour 1999 , Gomes 2016 , in part advanced because of the lack of classical causality in dealing with quantum phenomena and the fact that the equations of QM or QFT (or of classical physics or relativity) are mathematically time reversible. In the RWR view, however, this type of representation or this concept would not apply to the ultimate constitution of the reality, any more than concepts of change, becoming, motion, or space and time, or indeed any concepts. In the RWR view, the equations of QM or QFT, such as Schrödinger's equation or Dirac's equation, are not equations of motion of quantum objects, but are mathematical structures providing (along with Born's or analogous rules) quantum-nonlocal expectation-catalogs concerning the outcomes of possible quantum experiments, which requires the assumption of the arrow of time. What can, in the RWR view, be objectively ascertained is that the ultimate nature of reality is such that all our interactions with it, on all scales, by means of experimental technology (beginning with that of our bodies), including in dealing with quantum phenomena, entail the arrow of time, which quantum causality reflects.
With these considerations in mind one can understand Bohr's view of complementarity as a generalization of causality. On the one hand, "our freedom of handling the measuring instruments, characteristic of the very idea of experiment" in all physics, our "free choice" concerning what kind of experiment we want to perform is essential to complementarity (Bohr 1935, p. 699 ). On the other hand, as against classical physics or relativity, implementing our decision concerning what we want to do will allow us to make only certain types of predictions and will exclude the possibility of certain other, complementary, types of predictions. Complementarity generalizes causality in the absence of classical causality and, in the first place, realism, because it defines which events, which reality of events, are established by a measurement and which events can and cannot then be probabilistically or statistically predicted by our decision concerning which experiment to perform. Complementarity, as a quantum-mechanical concept is, again, defined as such by the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena and, hence, the RWR view, cannot be properly understood apart from probability. Conversely, however, the way probability and, with it, quantum causality, works in quantum physics cannot be understood apart from complementarity.
It is instructive to consider how complementarity and quantum causality work in the case of predictions with a "probability equal to unity," which, as will be seen in the next section, becomes crucial to countering EPR's argument, where this phrase plays a key role, as does the phrase "without any way disturbing the system," which I adopt as my title in this paper (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138) . Their criterion of physical reality (assumed in all of Einstein's argument concerning the subject) is as follows: "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity" (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138 ; EPR's emphasis). According to EPR, this "sufficient" criterion equally applies in classical and quantum physics, a claim challenged by Bohr, who argued that, while this criterion is (ideally) applicable in classical physics, it contains "an essential ambiguity" when applied, even ideally, to quantum phenomena, including those of the EPR type (Bohr 1935, p. 698) .
One might ask first: What does it mean to predict with probability equal to unity in physics? It means that we assumed that, if we measure the predicted quantity by means of some measuring instrument, this measurement confirms our prediction. Does this quantity correspond to an element of physical reality, unless the measurement is performed? Technically, this is not so even in classical physics, because there could be factors that will make it no longer possible to obtain the predicted value by a measurement. Rigorously speaking, no predictions with probability equal to unity could guarantee that what is so predicted will happen. In classical physics or relativity, however, this is not a serious objection to EPR's criterion, because it applies ideally in principle, unless there is an outside interference. 20 A prediction with probability equal to unity is an idealization because the value of the predicted quantity cannot be measured exactly or always predicted exactly. This idealization is, however, permissible in classical mechanics in deals with small systems (apart from chaotic ones), because one can repeat each individual experiment and improve our measurements with each repetition, in principle indefinitely.
The situation is essentially different in the case of quantum phenomena because of the irreducible role of measuring instruments in their constitution and complementarity, which in effect disables Einstein's criterion or at least makes it ambiguous, even in an ideal experiment, such as the EPR experiment. First of all, we cannot repeat quantum experiments in the way we can in classical physics or to improve the precision of our measurement beyond the limits establish by the uncertainty relations, which, as I said, would apply even if we had ideal instruments. As will be seen in the next section, this impossibility of repeating a given quantum experiment with the same outcome plays an implicit role in the EPR-type experiments, a role unperceived by EPR. All we can numerically improve is our calculations of probabilities of our predictions. For the moment, suppose that one had predicted, on the basis of a position measurement at time t1 a future value of the position of an object at time t2 with probability equal to unity, which is possible, as in EPR-type experiments, by means of a measurement performed on a different quantum object and thus without in any way disturbing the first one. This prediction can then always be confirmed, again, within the limit of idealization, by the corresponding position measurement at t2, in accord with EPR's criterion of reality. However, as explained earlier, measuring at t2 the value of the complementary variable, that of momentum, instead of the predicted one, that of the position, will make it impossible to assign the position variable to the object at t2, even though if we had measured the position instead it would strictly correspond to our prediction. There is no experiment that could allow us to do so, as opposed to classical physics, where we can, in principle, always measure both variables simultaneously. In other words, a prediction with probability equal to unity is applicable, even ideally, only if this prediction is in principle verifiable, which cannot be assured in considering quantum phenomena, including those of the EPR type, in the way it could be at least in principle in classical physics. 21 These are these considerations that ultimately (following Bohr's exchange with EPR-type) led Bohr to adopt the view that only a measurement, which establishes a registered phenomenon, and never a prediction, even with probability equal to unity, defines what is real at both levels, phenomena and quantum objects or, again (and here this qualification becomes especially important), the RWR-type reality they idealize.
This analysis of predictions with probability equal to unity in quantum physics helps one to argue that the EPR experiment confirms that, although quantum-nonlocal, QM mechanics is both a complete (insofar as it predicts anything that is possible to predict, as things stand now) and Einstein-local, rather than shows that QM is either incomplete or Einstein-nonlocal, as EPR contended. This contention, Bohr argued, was open to challenge because EPR and Einstein in his subsequent communications underappreciated the role of measuring instruments and complementarity in defining quantum phenomena.
Reality, complementarity, and quantum nonlocality in the EPR experiment
As Khrennikov's articles cited here note, during the last half a century, following Bell's and the Kochen-Specker theorem and related theoretical and experimental findings, the debates concerning quantum foundations has shifted towards quantum correlations and quantum nonlocality, vis-à-vis the completeness of QM, although the question of completeness or, correlatively, realism has remained an unavoidable background of these debates. Most of these findings and arguments involved in these debates deal with discrete variables and Bohm's version of the EPR experiment. The main reason is that, unlike the original thought-experiment proposed by EPR, which cannot be performed in a laboratory, Bohm's version of the EPR experiment, which deals with discrete variables, could and has been performed, confirming the existence of quantum correlations. 22 These correlations can be ascertained experimentally, apart from QM. Neither EPR's article nor Bohr's reply used the terms "correlations" and "entanglement," introduced by Schrödinger, in responding to EPR's paper. On the other hand, the question of locality, expressly vs. completeness, was central to the Bohr-EPR exchange and to Einstein's subsequent communications, compelling him to speak of "a spooky action at a distance" [spukhafte Fernwirkung] (e.g., Born 2005, p. 155) . 21 That a prediction with probability equal to unity is not the same as establishing the reality of what is so predicted has been also stressed by quantum Bayesians (QBist), but on the ground of the subjective nature of Bayesian probability, rather than the type of reasoning used here (e.g., Fuchs et al 2014; Mermin 2016, pp. 231-238) . 22 As indicated earlier, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, dealing with continuous variables, cannot be physically realized, because the entangled quantum state designed by EPR is not normalizable. This fact does not affect the fundamentals of the case, which can be made by considered it as an idealized experiment. There are experiments (those involving photon pairs produced in parametric down conversion) that statistically approximate the EPR experiment for continuous variables, in parallel with Bohm's version of the EPR experiment for discrete variables. The analysis of the latter experiment involves further subtleties, including involvinh idealizations. Arguably, the best treatment is offered by N. D. Mermin in several papers assembled in (Mermin 1990, pp. 81-185). Ironically, realist (Einstein-complete) theories that would predict EPR-type correlations appears to be Eintein-nonlocal (or alternatively, violate other assumptions generally regarded as basic) in view of Bell's and the Kochen-Specker theorems, and related findings, which thus far deal with discrete variables. Among the most famous of these findings are those of D. M. Greenberger, M. Horne, A. Zeilinger, and L. Hardy, and, from the experimental side, A. Aspect's experiment and related experimental work, such as that by A. Zeilinger and his group (Aspect et al 1982 , Greenberger et al 1989 , Greenberger et al 1990 , Hardy 1993 . 23 As I said, the meaning of these findings, or the EPR experiment and Einstein's and Bohr's arguments concerning it, have been intensely debated. I shall bypass these debates, in part because my argument deals with the subject via complementarity, underappreciated in these debates. 24 I would argue, however, that at stake in all of these findings are situations that are governed by complementarity and that can be considered from an RWR-type perspective. In order to support this argument, I shall reexamine the key features of Bohr's reply to EPR, based on his (RWR-type) interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, as considered in the preceding analysis.
Bohr contested Einstein's argumentation by offering this interpretation and, most especially, by analyzing in detail the roles of measuring instruments and complementarity. It was Bohr's analysis of these roles, which, he argued, were underappreciated by EPR, that allowed him to conclude that QM "would seem to fulfill, within its scope, all rational demands for completeness," at least in Bohr's sense of completeness, insofar as it predicted everything that could be predicted in accordance with the experimental evidence available (Bohr 1935, pp. 696, 700n; also Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 57) . He also argued that QM fulfills these demands without sacrificing Einsteinlocality, by virtue of the compatibility of Bohr's argument and, thus, his interpretation of quantum phenomena, including those of the EPR type, and QM with "all exigencies of relativity theory," which implies Einstein-locality (Bohr 1935, p. 701n ).
Bohr's interpretation in his reply was somewhat different from his ultimate interpretation (developed following his exchange with EPR), which no longer allowed for any assignment of elements of reality to quantum objects-before, at the time, or after measurement-because, as discussed in Section 3, the measured value of the quantum stratum was of the measuring instrument after the instrument had interacted with the object, a value "amplified" to the corresponding classical variable associated with the observed part of the instrument. This view emerged later, in following and under an impact of the Bohr-EPR exchange. In his reply, this assignment is possible at the time of measurement. 25 However, given that this less radical view still allowed him to argue 23 I only cite some of the key earlier experiments. There have been numerous experiments performed since, some in order to find loopholes in these and related subsequent experiments. 24 The literature dealing with these subjects is nearly as immense as that on interpretations of QM. Among the standard treatments are (Bell 2004 , Cushing and McMullin 1989 , Ellis and Amati 2000 . N. D. Mermin, again, offers a particularly lucid treatment (Mermin 1998, pp. 81-185) . See also (Brunner et al 2014) , for a current assessment of Bell's theorem. These theorems and most of these findings pertain to quantum data as such, and do not depend on QM. It should also be kept in mind that there are realist views of quantum entanglement and correlations, either in realist interpretations of QM (for example, the many worlds interpretation) or in alternative theories, such as Bohmian mechanics, or theories in which the level of reality handled by QM is underlain by a deeper reality (even within the proper scope of QM), such as that of classical random fields (Khrennikov 2010) . So-called superdeterminism is another realist view, which presents a particularly striking contrast to the present argument, because it explains away the complexities discussed here by denying an independent decision of performing one or the other EPR measurements, a possibility central to Bohr's view and defining complementarity (e.g., 't Hooft 2018) . 25 Schrödinger adopts a similar view of quantum measurement in his presentation of the nonrealism of "the doctrine" in his cat-paradox paper, which he notes implies that the "pointer position" of the instrument "is always reproduced within certain error limits when the process is immediately repeated (on the same object, which in the meantime must that quantum objects or their behavior cannot be considered independently, the essential logic of his reply, especially its argument for the irreducible role of measuring instruments and complementarity in considering quantum phenomena, could be presented in Bohr's later terms as well. Bohr argued that, because of this joint role, quantum phenomena, including of the EPR type, disallow EPR's conception of physical reality and the corresponding criterion of physical reality they introduce, or at least, the unqualified way in which the criterion was used by EPR. It is true that Bohr only argued for (along with Einstein-locality) the Bohr-completeness of quantum mechanics, rather than for its Einstein-completeness. QM, again, expressly is not Einsteincomplete in Bohr's interpretation by virtue of its RWR-type character, because it does not offer a representation of the objects and processes responsible for quantum phenomena. However, this is all Bohr needed to do in countering EPR's argument. EPR did not contend that QM was not Einstein-complete, but rather that it was not even Bohr-complete because its predictions were not exhaustive, unless QM or quantum phenomena themselves allowed for Einstein-nonlocality. In his later communications, Einstein acknowledged that, if the statistical predictions of QM exhaust the possibilities of observation, thus making it Bohr-complete, one can also see it as Einstein-local (Born 2005, pp. 155, 205) . As noted earlier, this still could not satisfy Einstein, because he saw Einstein-completeness as necessary for a fundamental theory (e.g., Born 2005, pp. 155, 166-170, 205; Einstein 1949a, p. 81) .
It would extend the paper beyond its scope to give justice to EPR's argument and Bohr's reply. I shall only offer a sketch of the exchange and then proceed to EPR complementarity, which is the instance of the concept that reflects some of its deepest aspects (Bohr 1935, p. 700) . 26 The crux of the EPR argument is that the EPR (idealized) thought-experiment allows for predictions with certainty concerning quantum objects without physically interfering with them by means of measurement, and thus, in EPR's view, "without in any way disturbing the system," in accordance with their "criterion of reality": "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with the probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity" (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138; EPR's emphasis) . This possibility would seem to circumvent the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of all quantum phenomena, and thus both the uncertainty relations and complementarity. As Bohr argued in his reply, the application of this criterion in considering quantum phenomena, including of the EPR type, poses difficulties, underappreciated by EPR or Einstein in his subsequent communications.
An EPR prediction concerning a quantum object, S2, of the EPR pair (S1, S2), is enabled by performing a measurement on another quantum object, S1, with which, S2, has previously been in interaction, but from which it is spatially separated at the time of the measurement on S1. Specifically, once S1 and S2, are separated, QM allows one to simultaneously assign both the distance between the two objects and the sum of their momenta, because the corresponding Hilbertspace operators commute. With these quantities in hand, by measuring either the position or, conversely, the momentum of S1, one can predict exactly either the position or the momentum for S2 without physically interfering with, "disturbing," S2, which would, EPR assumed, imply that not be exposed to any additional influences" (Schrödinger 1935, p. 158) . In Bohr's view, a pointer position would not correspond to any value of the object or the quantum stratum of the instrument that interacted with the object, but only to the value of the corresponding variable associated with the observable part of the instrument, "amplified" to this classical level. Schrödinger, again, does not consider this type of measurement architecture. 26 I have considered Bohr's reply in detail previously (Plotnitsky 2009, pp. 237-312; Plotnitsky 2012, pp. 107-136; Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 136-154) . The present discussion, however, modifies these treatments on several key points. one can simultaneously assign to S2 both quantities as elements of reality pertaining to S2. "The authors [EPR] ," Bohr said in his reply, "therefore want to ascribe an element of reality to each of the quantities represented by such variables. Since, moreover, it is a well-known feature of the present formalism of quantum mechanics that it is never possible, in the description of the state of a mechanical system, to attach definite values to both of two canonically conjugate variables, [EPR] consequently deem this formalism to be incomplete, and express the belief that a more satisfactory theory can be developed" (Bohr 1935, p. 696) . It follows, then, if EPR are correct, that the formalism would not even be Bohr-complete, insofar as QM does not predict all that is possible to predict. The only alternative, as EPR saw it, would be the Einstein-nonlocal nature of quantum phenomena or QM (Einstein et al 1935, p.141) . They disallowed this possibility, as did Bohr, although, as noted earlier, it has been assumed by some, also as explaining quantum nonlocality. EPR's reasoning would equally apply to the Bell-Bohm type of EPR measurements for discrete variables, say, complementary spin-direction measurements.
Bohr counterargued that the situation does not allow one to dispense with the role of measuring instruments, because this role entails limitations on the types of measuring arrangements used in determining the quantities in question, even if one does so in terms of predictions without performing a measurement on the object, S2, concerning which these predictions are made (but only a measurement on another quantum object, S1, with which the object in question previously interacted). These limitations result from "an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions [by measurements on S1, regarding the future behavior of the system [S2]" (Bohr 1935, p.700) . It is disregarding this influence (which is not a physical influence on S2!), as EPR do, that gives EPR's criterion of reality its "essential ambiguity" when it applied to quantum phenomena, which ambiguity disables their argument. By contrast, exposing the irreducible nature of this influence, as defining our measurements of S1 and the resulting predictions concerning S2 , and taking this influence and, in the first place, these conditions into account, allowed Bohr to argue that neither EPR's argument for the incompleteness of QM nor their reasoning concerning the Einstein-nonlocality of QM, as an alternative, could be sustained.
As indicated earlier, Bohr's thinking concerning the situation eventually led him to his ultimate interpretation, in which only what has already occurred determines any physical quantity considered, and not what has been predicted (even with certainty) and is yet to be confirmed by a measurement. Bohr's reply, however, assesses EPR's argument on their terms, whereby it is possible to assign certain properties to quantum objects under the constraints of the uncertainty relations, rather than in terms of his ultimate interpretation. Bohr also assumes, as do EPR, that this assignment is possible on the basis of a prediction with "probability equal to unity" rather than only a measurement, but, in contrast to EPR, only predictions that are in principle verifiable. This is a crucial qualification, necessary in considering quantum phenomena but missed by EPR.
Thus, both EPR and Bohr assume that the EPR experiment for (S1, S2) can be set in two alternative ways so as to predict, with the probability equal to unity, either one or the other of the complementary measurable quantities for S2 on the basis of measuring the corresponding quantities for S1. Bohr thus did not question the EPR experiment itself, which he saw as perfectly legitimate and, its idealized nature notwithstanding, revealing the deeper essence of quantum phenomena, and which, as explained earlier, he eventually came to see as pertaining to and even (with simple additional arrangements) as possible to stage, again, as an idealized case, in any quantum measurement. Let us call this assumption "assumption A."
On the basis of this assumption, EPR infer that both of these quantities can be assigned to S2, even though it is impossible to do so simultaneously (in view of the uncertainty relations for the corresponding measurements on S1). This makes QM incomplete (under EPR's criterion) because it has no mechanism for this assignment, unless one allows for Einstein-nonlocality (Einstein et al, p. 141) . Let us call this inference "inference E" (for Einstein).
Bohr argued that, while assumption A is legitimate, inference E is unsustainable because, as discussed earlier in considering any quantum measurement on the EPR-entanglement model, a realization of the two situations necessary for the respective assignment of these quantities would involve two incompatible (complementary) experimental arrangements and, thus, two different quantum objects, and two different EPR pairs to prepare them. There is no physical situation in which this joint assignment is ever possible for the same object, either simultaneously or separately. If one makes the EPR prediction, with probability equal to unity, for the second object, S12 , of a given EPR pair, (S11, S12), one would always need a different EPR pair (S21, S22) to get to make the measurement on S21, in order to make an alternative EPR prediction concerning S22. I designate this inference as "inference B" (for Bohr).
Nor is an identical assignment of the single quantity ever possible, or in any event, ever guaranteed, for two "identically" prepared objects in the way it can be in classical physics. This is, as explained earlier, because quantum experiments cannot be controlled so as to identically prepare quantum objects but only so as to identically prepare measuring instruments, because the behavior of the instruments (of their observable parts) is classical. The quantum strata of measuring instruments throughout which they interact with quantum objects do not affect these preparations but only the outcome of an actual measurement. On the other hand, this interaction is quantum and, hence, "uncontrollable," the point brought up by Bohr at two key junctures of his argument (Bohr 1935, pp. 697, 700) . It follows that the outcomes of repeated, identically prepared, experiments, including those of the EPR type, cannot be controlled, and these outcomes will, in general, be different. This circumstance makes statistical considerations unavoidable in the EPR experiment, even though each prediction involved can be made with probability equal to unity, which prediction by itself, as noted above, still does not guarantee that the quantity thus predicated is an "element of reality" in quantum physics. This aspect of the situation does not appear to have been realized by EPR, whose inference E and their argumentation implicitly depends on the possibility of the identical repetition of the EPR experiment, precluded by inference B.
One can diagrammatically represent the situation as follows. Let X and Y be two complementary variables, either continuous or discrete, in the Hilbert-space formalism (XY -YX ≠ 0) and x and y the corresponding physical measurable quantities (DxDy ≈ h); (S1, S2) is the EPR pair of quantum objects; and p is the probability of prediction, via the wave function, Y. Then:
The EPR experiment (in EPR's and Einstein's view, which considers one EPR pair): S1 S2 X1 Y1 (with p = 1) ®
X2 Y1
Y2 (with p = 1) ®
Y2
The EPR experiment (in Bohr's view, according to which two EPR pairs are always required for two EPR predictions): S11 S12 X11
Y22
This diagram is that of a complementarity, which may be called the EPR complementarity. This complementarity can be described as follows. Once one type of measurement (say, that of variable X) is performed on S11, enabling the corresponding prediction on S12, we irrevocably cut ourselves off from any possibility of making the alternative, complementary, measurement (that of Y) on S11 and, thus, from the possibility of ever predicting the second variable for S12 (Bohr 1935, p. 700) . There is simply no way to define that variable for S12, except of course by a measurement, which, however, defeats the very purpose of EPR's argument. By prediction, this could only be done on S22, which is to say by preparing another EPR pair and performing a complementary measurement of Y on S21, which will irrevocably prevent us from establishing X for S22.
As noted earlier, stemming from "our freedom of handling the measuring instruments, characteristic of the very idea of experiment" in all physics, our "free choice" concerning what kind of experiment we want to perform is essential to complementarity (Bohr 1935, p. 699 ). However, as against classical physics or relativity, implementing our decision concerning what we want to do will allow us to make only certain types of predictions and exclude the possibility of certain other, complementary, types of predictions, which would require a different experimental arrangement and in fact a different object to be measured. In the EPR case, it is only possible to establish both complementary quantities for two EPR pairs, (S11, S12) and (S21, S22) , and never for one, and if we had predicted the second quantity, instead of the first one, for S12, it would not, in general, be the same as it is for S22. This is a manifestation of quantum causality. The situation is inherently statistical: if we repeat the experiment for yet another identically prepared pair, say, (S31, S32), so as to make predictions concerning the position of S32, we can make such a prediction exactly, but the outcome of the measurement on S32, will not in general be the same as for S12 or S22. Once we performed both types of measurement for many pairs, we will have statistically correlated measurements, commonly manifested in spin measurements of the Bell-Bohm type. The preceding argument would clearly apply to them.
Bohr does not explain the situation in terms of two different objects and EPR pairs necessary in order to make the second EPR prediction. As, however, the discussion of quantum measurement in Sections 2 and 3 suggests, this is at least an implication of his argument, given his insistence in his reply and elsewhere that "in the problem in question we are not dealing with a single specified experimental arrangement, but are referring to two different, mutually exclusive, arrangements" (Bohr 1987, v. 2 p. 57, 60; Bohr 1935, p. 699) . In view of this mutual exclusivity, due to the irreducible role of the measuring instruments, the second quantity in question cannot in principle be assigned to the same quantum object, once one such quantity is assigned. However, we can always make an alternative choice in selecting a measuring arrangement and thus measuring or predicting the other complementarity variable in question, which is a defining aspect of complementarity. The joint assignment is not possible even if one accepts EPR's criterion of reality, whereby such an assignment is made on the basis of a prediction, unless we add the context of measurement to this criterion, which in effect is what Bohr suggested. It is not possible once an experiment enabling one to make the first prediction is performed, because the first object S1 (using the notation corresponding to EPR's view of the experiment) or S11 (using the notation corresponding to Bohr's view of the experiment) is no longer available. The simultaneous assignment of both is, again, precluded by the uncertainty relations, which is recognized by EPR. They aim to show that the uncertainty relations could be circumvented by arguing that both variables could in fact be assigned to a given quantum object at any moment of time, although only one of them could be actually measured or predicted. This leads them to reason that QM is incomplete (even Bohr-incomplete), or else nonlocal. Bohr counterargues that the uncertainty relations or complementarity, both defined by the irreducible role of measuring instrument in the constitution of all quantum phenomena, those of the EPR-type included, disallow one ever to simultaneously assign both quantities to or even simultaneously define them for any quantum object, even in the EPR case. Bohr concludes:
From our point of view we now see that the wording of the above mentioned criterion of physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen contains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression "without in any way disturbing a system." Of course there is in a case like that just considered no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation [the second object of the EPR pair considered, concerning which we make the EPR prediction at a distance] during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system. Since these conditions constitute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which the term "physical reality" can be properly attached, we see that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does not justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially incomplete. On the contrary this description, as appears from the preceding discussion, may be characterized as a rational utilization of all possibilities of unambiguous interpretation of measurements, compatible with the finite [quantum] and uncontrollable interaction between the object and the measuring instruments in the field of quantum theory. In fact, it is only the mutual exclusion of any two experimental procedures, permitting the unambiguous definition of complementary physical quantities, which provides room for new physical laws the coexistence of which might at first sight appear irreconcilable with the basic principles of science. It is just this entirely new situation as regards the description of physical phenomena that the notion of complementarity aims at characterizing. (Bohr 1935, p. 700; Bohr's emphasis) 27 This elaboration, especially Bohr's claim concerning "the essential ambiguity" of EPR's use of their criterion and specifically that this ambiguity pertains to the meaning of EPR's expression "without in any way disturbing a system," have posed difficulties for Bohr's readers. Bohr acknowledged these difficulties and the main reason for them, essentially the fact, defining the argument of this paper, that one deals here with the impossibility of unambiguously considering quantum objects and their independent behavior because of the irreducible role of measuring instrument in the constitution of quantum phenomena. As he said: "I am deeply aware of the inefficiency of expression which must have made it very difficult to bring out the essential ambiguity involved in a reference to physical attributes of objects when dealing with phenomena where no sharp distinction can be made between the behavior of the objects themselves and their interaction with the measuring instruments" (Bohr 1949 .
However, the elaboration and Bohr's meaning in this particular clause, "an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression 'without in any way disturbing a system'" pose no special difficulties given the preceding analysis. Once one quantity in question is established (even on the basis of a prediction, in accordance with EPR's criterion of reality) for S12, we cannot ever establish the second quantity involved without measuring and hence disturbing S12. Only one of these quantities could be established for S12 without disturbing it, but once it is established, never the other quantity without disturbing it. We can establish such an alternative quantity without disturbing it only for a different quantum object, S22, via a different EPR pair (S21, S22), by a measurement of a complementary type on S21. These two determinations cannot be coordinated so as to assume that both quantities could be associated with the same object of the same EPR pair. The coordination of such events can only be statistical. We cannot establish both quantities for the same system without in any way disturbing it. The only way to establish the second quantity for this system would be to perform a measurement on and thus disturb it, which, however, would erase the determination of the first quantity, if one assumes, as the EPR do, that it could be made on the basis of a prediction on the first object of the corresponding EPR pair. This point, as will be seen below, is also crucial for maintaining the Einstein-locality of quantum mechanics. Thus, the ambiguity in question indeed relates to the clause "without in any way disturbing the system," which, if one wants to apply this clause rigorously in the EPR situation, requires qualifications explained in the present analysis but not provided by EPR. These qualifications amounting to the fact that both quantities in question are complementary and as such can never be predicted for the same system, which would disable not only EPR's argument concerning the incompleteness (Bohrincompleteness) of QM, as just explained, but, as will be seen presently, also concerning their alternative claim, that of Einstein-nonlocality.
Before I consider this issue, I reiterate that the considerations just offered could be transferred, with a few easy adjustments, to Bohm's version of the EPR experiment and spin variables. In this case, too, there is the EPR complementarity insofar as any assignment of the alternative spinrelated quantity to the same quantum objects becomes impossible, once one such quantity is assigned. An assignment of the other would require an alternative type of measurement, mutually exclusive with the first, on the first object of a given pair, and hence, at least, another fully identically behaving EPR-Bohm pair, which is, again, not possible or at least cannot be guaranteed. Nothing other than statistical correlations between such assignments is possible, which is consistent with the Bell-EPR correlations, which are statistical. The argument concerning locality could be similarly transferred to discrete variables as well.
EPR acknowledged a possible loophole in their argument by admitting that they did not demonstrate that one could ever simultaneously ascertain both quantities in question for the same quantum object, such as S2 in the EPR experiment, in the same location, either that of S1 or S2. 28 They, however, see this requirement as implying Einstein-nonlocality:
One could object to this conclusion on the grounds that our criterion of reality is not sufficiently restrictive. Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that two or more physical quantities can be regarded as simultaneous elements of reality only when they can be simultaneously measured or predicted. On this point of view, since either one or the other, but not both simultaneously, of the quantities P and Q can be predicted, they are not simultaneously real. This makes the reality of P or Q depend upon the process of measurement carried out on the first system, which does not disturb the first system in any way. No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this. (Einstein et al 1938, p. 141) Einstein-nonlocality indeed follows if one assumes, as EPR do, that the measurement, say, of P, on S1 fixes the physical state itself of S2 by "a spooky action at a distance," rather than allows "a spooky prediction at a distance," or quantum nonlocality, by fixing the possible conditions of such a prediction. It follows, under EPR's assumption, that an alternative measurement of Q on S2 would discontinuously change this fixed state, although EPR do not examine this last eventuality as such. Or, as Einstein argued on later occasions, one is left with a paradoxical situation insofar as (assuming that QM is complete) two mutually incompatible states could be assigned to the same distant quantum object or system, S2, by a different "spooky action at a distance," defined by a different measurement performed on S1 (e.g., Born 2005, p. 205) . 29 This is why EPR contend that, if QM is complete by their criterion, then the physical state of a system, S2, could be determined by a measurement on a spatially separate system, S1, in violation of the Einstein locality, while their criterion of reality no longer applies in its original form. If it is Einstein-local, their main argument, based on their criterion of reality, showed (they believed) that it is incomplete.
Einstein thought that Bohr accepted the alternative of Einstein-locality vs. completeness (Einstein-locality vs. Bohr-completeness) , and retained completeness by allowing for Einsteinnonlocality. Einstein, however, misread Bohr's argument, which only allows for a spooky prediction, and not action, at a distance, something running contrary to Einstein's "own way of thinking," into which, as he himself said, he "translated" Bohr's argument: "translated into my own way of putting it" (Einstein 1949b, p. 681) . Beginning with bypassing the role of quantum measurement and ending with seeing nonlocality as acceptable to Bohr in order to preserve the completeness of quantum mechanics as concerns individual quantum systems, Bohr's argument is lost in Einstein's "translation." This "translation" reads Einstein's own logic of the relationships between locality and completeness into Bohr's very different logic, which, as noted, "ensures the compatibility between [his] argument and all exigencies of relativity theory," and thus Einsteinlocality (Bohr 1935, p. 701n; Plotnitsky 2009, pp. 245-247) .
There is a difference between determining, fixing, the state of a physical object by a prediction and possibly establishing it on the basis of a prediction, "a prediction with probability equal to unity." In Bohr's counterargument in his reply to EPR, physical states of quantum objects cannot be seen as finally determined (even when we have predicted them exactly) unless either the actual measurement is made or the possibility of verifying the prediction is assured insofar as such a measurement could, in principle, be performed so as to yield the predicted value. This last requirement in turn becomes a necessary qualification of EPR's criterion of reality in the case of quantum phenomena. This is because, as discussed in Section 4 in considering any prediction with probability equal to unity in quantum physics, if one assumes the validity of EPR's criterion in its original (unrestricted) form, the measurement of the alternative quantity, Q, on S2 would automatically disable any possible verification of the original prediction. It is crucial and is, as noted, central to complementarity that it is always possible to perform this alternative measurement. This is one of the reasons why, the assumption of the independent existence or reality of quantum objects or something in nature so idealized becomes especially important for Bohr's analysis of the EPR experiment and of the question of locality in it. This independent existence or reality ensures the possibility of this measurement. However, once this alternative measurement is performed, the original prediction becomes meaningless as in principle unverifiable. This, again, implies that both quantities in question could never be experimentally ascertained for the same object and hence that QM could not be shown to be (Einstein) nonlocal by EPR's logic, any more than it can be shown to be (Bohr) incomplete by their logic.
According to Bohr, EPR's logic is disabled by the nature of quantum phenomena, as defined by the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of these phenomena, and thus by the impossibility of considering the behavior of quantum objects independently of their interaction with these instruments, in other words, noncontextually. The application of EPR's criterion of reality becomes, Bohr argues, "ambiguous" by virtue of the lack of qualifications of this criterion required by these conditions, which is to say, by complementarity. While they do not speak in terms of complementarity, EPR's paper or Einstein's subsequent communications in effect aim to show that, given the data obtainable in quantum phenomena, it should be possible, assuming Einstein-locality, to circumvent both the uncertainty relation and complementarity. This would make QM, which is consistent with both incomplete, even Bohr-incomplete, insofar as "its predictions [did] not exhaust the possibilities of observation" (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 57) or Einsteinnonlocal. Bohr counterargues that both are uncircumventable, because of the uncircumventable role of measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena, a role that defines the "conditions [that] constitute an inherent element of the description of any [quantum] phenomenon to which the term 'physical reality' can be properly attached (Bohr 1935, p. 700 ).
Conclusion
By bringing together the irreducible role of measuring instruments, the RWR view, discreteness of quantum phenomena, complementarity, (in effect) entanglement, and quantum nonlocality, QM may be interpreted as an Einstein-local and yet also complete theory, admittedly only Bohrcomplete, in that it predicts all that nature allows us to predict, as things stand now. As I said, Einstein eventually acknowledged that the statistical predictions of QM might be seen as exhausting the possibilities of observation, thus making quantum mechanics Bohr-complete, while also allowing for Einstein-locality. Einstein, however, still found this insufficient for a fundamental theory, which he required to be Einstein-complete. Perhaps, the question is not so much what we require from a fundamental theory, although experimental evidence can lead to such requirements (which was, however, not Einstein's motivation), but what a fundamental theory, either one already in place or one we need to develop, requires from us. One of the things it may require from us is a change of our attitude toward problems, such as that of the nature of physical reality, that we confront. I would argue, given Bohr's customarily careful way of expressing his points, that his statement "a radical revision of our attitude toward the problem of physical reality" (Bohr 1935, p. 697; emphasis added) need not mean that one should necessarily adopt any particular concept of reality, even though Bohr did adopt an RWR-type concept of it, as against, a realist one. More important is our attitude itself toward the problem of physical reality or any problem we confront: we should not be bound by previously established views and be ready to change our ways of thinking, no matter how ingrained or cherished, if physics requires it.
